Year LXIV, 2022, Single Issue, Page 109
THE WORLD FEDERALIST MOVEMENT AND THE TRANSITION TOWARDS A NEW WORLD ORDER
This year marks the 75th anniversary of the Montreux Declaration, the text approved, on 23 August, 1947, by the first congress of the Mouvement Universel pour une Confédération Mondiale (MUCM).[1] In June 1986, during a meeting in Aosta, the MUCM became the World Federalist Movement.[2] This anniversary is a good starting point for making some initial considerations on the situation of the organisation that brings together the federalist movements operating in various parts of the world, and also, in the light of the current world political scenario, on the action it might potentially take in the future.
The Events and Circumstances Calling for a New Strategy Towards World Federation.
The years leading up to and, in particular, following the Montreux Declaration saw the world split into two opposing blocs, led respectively by the USA and the former Soviet Union, and then drawn into the Cold War. Moreover, in the Western world, they were years characterised by the undisputed leadership, both military and economic-financial, of the USA. This phase ended at the end of 1991 with the collapse of the USSR and subsequent dissolution of the Eastern bloc, events that opened a brief period in which talk of American unipolarity reinforced the expectation that the liberal democratic model might progressively be extended to the whole world under the direction of the USA; China's possible entry into the World Trade Organisation was seen as a step in this direction. World politics, however, followed a different path, one already anticipated by federalists even when such developments could barely be predicted.[3]
The aim here is not to retrace all the steps that have led to the current global framework, now universally described as “multipolar”, but to recall just two specific events that, even though their significance is already well known to federalists, are worth highlighting here because they mark the direction in which world politics is moving. The first, immediately recognised by federalists as the “end of the bipolar equilibrium”, was China’s detonation, in 1964, of its first atomic bomb, which was its way of rejecting the Soviet leadership of the communist world. The second was America’s decision, in August 1971, to suspend the convertibility of the dollar into gold, which amounted to an admission that it was no longer able to maintain monetary order globally; it also showed the USA’s reluctance to accept solutions within the existing multilateral institutional framework, such as Triffin’s idea of resorting to the use of special drawing rights (SDRs). This American line was, in fact, the first blow dealt to the functioning of the multilateral institutions that, inspired by the Americans, had been created at Bretton Woods in 1944.
The phase that has opened up in recent years, therefore, seems to be characterised, on the one hand, by the USA’s increasingly evident incapacity to guarantee its leadership of the Western world, also from a security perspective, and on the other by the rest of the world’s growing rejection of the prospect of the West retaining its sole global leadership position. A number of elements bear this out. The first, and also the most important from the perspective of the Europeans’ security, is the uncertainty concerning the future of NATO and its military structure, which has been fuelled both by Obama’s talk of European free-riding[4] and above all, several years earlier, by the announcement, heralding the biggest change in American military strategy since the end of WWII, that Asia, not Europe, was the most important strategic front for American security. These developments, which were followed by Trump’s condemnation of NATO as “obsolete”[5] and Macron’s verdict that it is becoming “brain dead”,[6] culminated in the hasty withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan, decided unilaterally by Biden in August 2021.
As clearly shown by Trump’s electioneering and frequent use of the slogans “America First” and “Make America Great Again”, the era of bipartisan US foreign policy, in which the importance of the Atlantic alliance is never seriously questioned (and Europe is merely criticised for failing to do enough militarily), is now coming to an end. Since the advent of Trump, who made himself a mouthpiece of the widespread feelings of discontent in American public opinion over the USA’s global policing role, and of impatience with an EU that fails to take responsibility for its own security, the USA’s Atlantic policy has become an important topic of political debate in the country, and it cannot be excluded that it will be questioned in the future. The EU, for its part, must start acknowledging that its security cannot depend on the outcome of American elections.
Fifty years on from the suspension of the convertibility of the dollar into gold, the USA, with Biden’s decision to abruptly withdraw from Afghanistan, has actually admitted its inability, on the political and military level, to keep order in the world. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is also a consequence of this new reality, even though the eastern EU countries remain confident that they can rely on American protection in the event of a conflict.
Uncertainty about America’s willingness to defend Europe by resorting, if necessary, to nuclear weapons, dates back to the evolution of American military strategy in the 1950s and 1960s and is therefore not a new development. In the 1950s, under Eisenhower, the USA had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, while the USSR was still only studying them. Back then, US policy, shaped by Foster Dulles, was to use the threat of massive retaliation as a means of preventing Soviet aggression against Europe. Subsequently, with the USSR rapidly increasing its arsenal of nuclear weapons and ICBMs capable of striking US territory, and thus brining America’s nuclear dominance to an end, the new American president John F. Kennedy called for a review of the massive retaliation strategy. This led to the adoption of Robert McNamara’s flexible response doctrine instead. The two strategies obviously had different implications for European security. Whereas, in the first case, America’s willingness to protect Europe could be taken as read, in the second there was greater uncertainty, given that it seemed unlikely that the US would be willing to sacrifice New York in order to save Berlin or Paris. De Gaulle, in fact, having immediately understood the meaning of the change in American strategy, decided that France should be equipped with its own nuclear arsenal and, later, that the country should not be part of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group.[7]
The other event worth mentioning is the 14th BRICS Summit, which took place on 23 and 24 June, 2022. BRICS is an acronym used to refer to an informal alliance that, embracing Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, includes both authoritarian and democratic countries. It was created in 2009 during a meeting, in Yekaterinburg, between Brazil, China, India and Russia, with South Africa coming on board a year later.[8] The June 2022 summit ended with hypocritical words of support for the values of freedom, democracy and respect for human rights, and a common declaration reaffirming the alliance’s support for multilateral institutions, in particular the WTO and the IMF.
While the BRICS alliance’s support for multilateral institutions may be dictated by expediency rather than a sincere belief in the need to respect for the common rules on which they are based, the fact is — and this is a currently decisive aspect — it does not call these institutions into question; to date, in fact, it is actually the USA that has created obstacles to their functioning.[9] And let us remember that it is the state of America’s global leadership, and that of the “Western world” generally, that is our focus here, not differences between “democratic systems” and “authoritarian systems”. And in this sense, the positions adopted by the BRICS countries in the UN General Assembly vote on the resolutions condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are revealing. On 3 March, 2022, the Assembly almost unanimously (141 votes) condemned the aggression, with only five countries voting against the resolution and 35 abstaining: the latter included China, India and South Africa, whereas Brazil voted in favour. On 7 April, on the other hand, the American proposal to suspend Russia from the Human Rights Council garnered 93 votes in favour, 24 against, and 58 abstentions. China voted against, while Brazil, India and South Africa abstained.
We have already cited Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a mark of the USA’s inability, in the political and military spheres, to keep order in the world, and of the end of American unipolarity. To this we should add further indicators, perhaps less known but more worrying, of the current instability of international relations, namely, the progressive increase in military expenditure and the level that this has reached in absolute terms. Using statistics produced by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), it is possible to reconstruct the trend of military expenditure from the years of the Cold War up to today. Looking solely at the most significant years, we can see that military spending (expressed in 2020 values) peaked in 1988, when Cold War tensions were at their highest, at a total of 1,499 billion dollars. From that year and in particular after the collapse of the USSR, military expenditure fell progressively, reaching a minimum of 1,054 billion dollars in 1996; it then remained at this level for roughly five years, after which it rose progressively, reaching 1,969 billion in 2021, at which point it had almost doubled over the previous fifteen years.[10] While it goes without saying that American and Chinese military expenditure is responsible for the biggest share of this increase, Europe is also set to make its contribution in the coming years. Indeed, over the next five years, EU military spending is expected to roughly double to 400 billion euros, taking global military expenditure to well over the 2,000-billion-dollar mark.
The World Federalist Movement’s Situation.
The new global framework raises the problem of how best to configure the relationship of collaboration between the European federalist organisations (the MFE and the UEF) and the WFM, and in particular, the question of the issue around which this collaboration can be launched. However, before putting forward proposals that, it is hoped, might be useful for the debate, it is necessary to take stock of the WFM’s situation.
The WFM has enjoyed a certain global notoriety for around a quarter of a century, i.e., since the newly formed Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC), made up of about 2,500 civil society organisations, entrusted the WFM with managing its campaign secretariat. This led William Pace to play the dual role of campaign coordinator and WFM executive director, and during his travels from continent to continent to promote the campaign for the International Criminal Court (ICC), he spoke in both capacities. Even though this arrangement allowed the WFM to solve two problems, one political and the other financial, it probably concealed an aspect of the movement’s political ideology that, explained below, really needs to be taken into account.
It solved a political problem because the campaign for the ICC, understood as an initiative that could be pursued with a view to the ultimate goal of world federation, was effectively able to become the WFM’s main political initiative. Given the scale of the mobilisation of the organisations involved in the campaign, the questions of whether or not the WFM as such was actively supporting it, and in particular of whether the movement’s American arm was directly involved in calling for the US government to ratify the treaty establishing the ICC (something it has yet to do), became questions of secondary importance.
It solved a financial problem in the sense that it provided the movement with funding. As shown by the financial statements submitted to the WFM Council, which included a consolidated balance sheet as well as separate balance ones for the CICC and WFM, the WFM received about 10 per cent of the CICC’s revenue (almost exclusively government grants). Moreover, analysis of the public contributions by origin highlighted an interesting fact, worth bearing in mind for possible future political initiatives promoted independently by the WFM, namely that European Commission funding accounted for about 50 per cent of the public contributions, while 20 per cent came from contributions from European governments and foundations, while the remainder was made up of contributions from American foundations.[11] This means that around two-thirds of the funding for the ICC campaign was European, since supporting this campaign was a priority for EU and European countries. It also means that similar support from the European side could, therefore, potentially be generated for other initiatives that fall within the priorities of Europe, the only continent in the world interested in supporting the strengthening of multilateral institutions.
Once the campaign for the ICC had substantially achieved its objectives,[12] the flow of revenue gradually decreased and, in parallel, the WFM’s financial problems began. After William Pace resigned his position as executive director, the WFM had three executive directors in the space of a few years, and downsized its offices.
Finally, as mentioned earlier, there is also an ideological consideration that must be kept in mind if we want to open an in-depth debate on the future of world federalism and the WFM. Indeed, it is crucial to remark that the organisation has manifested, especially in the past, globalist positions that seem to indicate support for a global role for the United States rather than an autonomous and convinced stance in favour of institutional developments in the direction of a world federation.[13]
In any case, with the exception of the important initiative promoted by the association Democracy Without Borders, which seeks the establishment of a World Parliamentary Assembly,[14] the WFM is still looking for a political action with global reach.[15]
The Initiatives to Promote During the Transition to World Federation: a Proposal.[16]
Although what is really needed is a whole debate on the initiatives that might be promoted in collaboration with the WFM, we can begin by formulating some initial reflections on the basis of what has been said thus far, after first adding some remarks to the brief considerations on the world order made earlier. In the opening section we merely listed some events and circumstances which show that the old global order has now entered an irreversible crisis, but made no mention of how to move on to a new one that is more stable than the current order, and also paves the way for a world federation. Above all, no reference was made to the political actor that might be able to assume responsibility for managing this phase. The view advanced here is that this actor can only be the EU.
China and Russia are two powers that, for the reasons set out at the start, are throwing the existing world order into question, and striving (even through military means in Russia’s case) to be recognised by the global international community as interlocutors that cannot be ignored in the process of defining a new world order. Since they are both authoritarian countries, it is unrealistic to expect them to lead a world order that embraces, among others, the driving values of the previous world order. In the same way, but for different reasons, this role cannot fall to the USA, a declining power incapable of keeping order in the world, be it economic-financial (yesterday) or political-military (today). Furthermore, as already remarked, the USA’s traditionally bipartisan Atlantic policy has become a bone of political contention within the United States, which makes it even more unrealistic to imagine that the country might champion, and assume responsibility for, a new world order. The USA’s only recent initiative, which actually confirms its decline, is its League of Democracies proposal;[17] in fact, this seems to signal a withdrawal more than a readiness to proceed towards a world system designed to include the emerging powers.
The only player on the world stage with the capacity to change the current balance of power and take the initiative for creating a new world order is the EU, since it is ideally placed to leverage the change in interstate relations introduced at the end of the Second World War. As federalists are well aware, and as history teaches us, relations between states have traditionally always been shaped by policies designed either to help one or some of them achieve a position of hegemony, or to foster a situation of equilibrium and thus prevent the emergence of a hegemonic power. But at the end of the Second World War, a third possibility was forged. At the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, it was decided, on an American initiative, to create multilateral institutions that would allow the traditional dichotomy between balance and hegemony to be overcome. The functioning of these institutions is not immune to the effects of changing relations between the main powers that belong to them; nevertheless, their creation, in itself, offered an alternative to the old model of interstate relations, and, as mentioned, the EU is the only player that, both by inclination and for its own good, is currently in a position to work to strengthen them.
However, to be a credible global player, the EU must not limit its foreign policy to trade policy and/or development aid, but must also directly shoulder its responsibilities in the military sector and equip itself with a foreign policy that, if necessary, involves the use of force. As Josep Borrell said in October 2019 during a hearing in the European Parliament, “the EU has to learn to use the language of power”.[18] As shown by the American “dual army” precedent,[19] this approach might initially be pursued through the creation of a European military force that could even be small, but has to be independent of the national armed forces, which could supplement it as and when necessary. In recent years, many steps have been or are being taken in this direction, such as the decision to establish a Rapid Deployment Capacity, which is due to start exercises in 2023, becoming fully operational by 2025. And this, in turn, makes it possible to begin reflecting on the direction in which European influence might be exercised, bearing in mind that the EU is in favour of strengthening multilateral institutions and regional integrations.
The journey to world federation is longer than might initially have been envisaged; above all, it requires a realistic approach that, interestingly, can be traced back to the text of the resolution (calling for European commitment to regional federations, and particularly to an African regional federation) that the Federalist Autonomy group presented to the 1964 Congress of the supranational European Federalist Movement in Montreux.[20] As the unfolding of political (and military) discourse and events shows us on a daily basis, Africa is the continent of most interest not just to the EU, but also to the world’s main powers (China, USA and Russia). The United States, for example, during its recent summit with African heads of government (13-15 December 2022) called for “greater (…) African representation in international institutions”, which might be achieved by admitting the African Union (AU) to the G20 as a permanent member and giving African countries seats on the United Nations Security Council.[21]
The European Commissioner Paolo Gentiloni, speaking at the Med-Dialogues conference of 2-3 December 2022, organised by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, remarked that “relations with the countries of the Mediterranean and Africa represent the future for the EU, which is why we have to have a vision that not only addresses emergencies, for example the food and energy crises, but also sees the Union as a whole, not individual states, making strategic investments.” Therefore if, as is held here, this statement is the expression of a concrete European interest in the African continent, the next question to ask is: what policies towards Africa can the EU promote?
The countries of Africa have signed many treaties relating to economic and monetary unification of their continent, but these treaties, including the most recent one establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), have never been ratified by all the AU member states and therefore cannot come into force. Generally speaking, the countries that have not ratified them are ones involved in local or civil wars. What this means is that, as the EU’s own experience confirms, security within African states and in relations between them is the crucial condition that will allow Africa to proceed gradually towards its own unification. From this perspective, the EU, most of whose civilian and military operations (almost always conducted under a UN mandate) concern the African continent, can play an essential and valuable role.
Although a recent SIPRI paper[22] remarks that these European initiatives have shown some weaknesses, the document fails to highlight their specifically political limits, namely, the fact that they are implemented as exceptional measures, in other words when problems have already erupted, rarely involve the AU as such or African regional organisations,[23] and, above all, are not linked to a political project that is shared with the AU and concerns Africa’s economic future. It therefore needs to be established what long-term project can be linked to a joint security policy between the EU and the AU; to do this, the best indication can be drawn from the declaration made by the African finance ministers at the end of their meeting with the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Africa on 1 October 2021 in Addis Abeba, whose text reads “African ministers also seized the opportunity to call for the establishment of a global price on carbon aligned to the Paris Agreement. African countries contribute the least to global emissions while also safeguarding some of the most important areas of biodiversity which are critical carbon sinks for all humanity. As such African countries should have the opportunity to leverage this critical role to raise financing to be invested in climate resilience and the green recovery to the benefit of their citizens”.[24]
Conceivably, therefore, sustainable development, to be pursued through a global carbon price, could be the point on which there might be a convergence of interests between the EU and the AU. It is certainly in the EU’s interest to collaborate with the AU in order to diversify its energy supply away from fossil sources, and, above all, it needs to finance the investments in the renewable energy sector that will have to be made if it is to meet its 2050 target for becoming a carbon-free economy. The AU, for its part, is certainly interested in investing in the renewable energy sector because, as underlined by Brando Benifei, MEP, speaking at the conference “African European Youth Conference (AEYC) – Designing a youth inclusive future for Africans and Europeans”, held in Turin on 22-23 October 2022, Africa could become the first continent in the world to be able to pursue “its own development agenda without needing to transition from fossil energy sources”.[25] Thus, the EU and AU could, for example, agree to introduce a Euro-African Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism as a step towards the introduction of a global carbon price. In this political-economic framework, a Euro-African agreement for a common security policy might also be reached.
In 2022, European and global federalists launched the first Euro-African initiatives on the issues of security and sustainable development. In particular, a couple of conferences involving the UEF and the WFM were held on the security of the African continent. The first, on 9 February, just ahead of the EU-AU summit in Brussels, was a webinar called “Towards a comprehensive strategy for Africa: some proposals”. Organised in collaboration with the UEF, the WFM, and the MFE’s Turin-based Ufficio del dibattito, it had around 40 participants. The second event, already mentioned, was the AEYC. Promoted by the association Youth for Intra-Dialogue on Europe and Africa (Y-IDEA), and supported with working papers produced by the Centre for Studies on Federalism, it was backed by, among others, b the European Parliament and the European Commission, and saw the participation of 250 young people in person and more than 50 remotely. Other initiatives with African youth groups have been promoted on the initiative of the Vice-President of the JEF, Juuso Järviniemi, while some young European federalists have created the association Y-IDEA, already mentioned.
These initiatives have made it possible to establish collaborative relationships with African interlocutors interested in working together to help their continent take steps towards the establishment of an African federation, both as a means of moving towards the objective of a world federation and also as the only way of allowing African citizens to speak with one voice in a profoundly changing world. It is also worth noting that this widespread interest suggests that the conditions exist for the UEF and the WFM to promote joint initiatives such as the establishment of a Euro-African Maritime Security Organisation,[26] or a Euro-African carbon border tax, and that they could perhaps benefit from the support of the European institutions in these endeavours just as the campaign for the ICC did.
Domenico Moro
[1] MUCM, Déclaration de Montreux, https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/adf279f7-80a4-4855-9215-48a5184328aa/publishable_fr.pdf.
[2] J.-F. Billion, Towards World Unity of the Federalists, The Federalist, 29 n. 2 (1987), p. 137.
[3] M. Albertini, La fin de l’équilibre bipolaire, Le Fédéraliste, 6 n. 2, p. 63, https://www.thefederalist.eu/site/index.php/fr/editoriaux/1188-la-fin-de-lequilibre-bipolaire; also published in Italian: Id., La fine dell’equilibrio bipolare, in: Id., Tutti gli scritti (N. Mosconi, ed.), vol. 4 (1962-1964), Bologna, Il Mulino, 2007, pp. 679-686, http://www.fondazionealbertini.org/sito/albertini/vol_iv/IV-1964-18-La%20fine%20dell'equilibrio%20bipolare.pdf.
[4] J. Goldberg, The Obama Doctrine, The Atlantic, April 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525.
[5] Donald Trump Says NATO is “Obsolete”, UN is “Political Game”, The New York Times, 2 April 2016.
[6] Emmanuel Macron Warns Europe: NATO is Becoming Brain-dead, The Economist, 7 November 2019.
[7] C. Ailleret, Opinion sur la théorie stratégique de la “flexible response”, Revue Défense Nationale, n. 227 (1964), pp. 1323-40.
[8] Cf., for example, C.F. Domìnguez, J.P. Santos Araujo, Brazil and other BRICS Countries, World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues, 16 n. 1 (2012), p. 164-79.
[9] S. Biscop, Biden’s National Security Strategy: Three Important Truths for Europe, https://www.egmontinstitute.be/bidens-national-security-strategy-three-important-truths-for-europe.
[10] SIPRI, Military Expenditure Database, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex. A brief comment on these data is called for. It is true that we are witnessing a substantial increase in military spending overall, but this fact conceals another much more important one. The increase in expenditure on armaments is also due to the fact that the military sector is experiencing unprecedented technological innovation. This bumps up the unit cost of weapon systems. To give a recent example, while the B-52 strategic bomber of the Cold War years, at 2012 prices and exchange rates, had a unit cost of 84 million dollars, the next generation bomber, the B-1, had a unit cost of 277 million dollars; moreover, the recently presented B-21 strategic bomber, intended to replace both the B-52 and the B-1, is estimated to have a unit cost (in 2022 values) of 692 million dollars (including costs of training, parts, and future modifications as needed) — that is eight times the cost of the B-52 and more than double the cost of the B-1. (B-21 Raider makes public debut; will become backbone of Air Force's bomber fleet: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2022/12/mil-221202-usaf01.htm?_m=3n%2e002a%2e3485%2etm0ao0d52y%2e38hf ).
[11] These percentages refer to total funding of approximately two million dollars received by the Coalition (cf., for example, WFM-IGP, Financial Statements and supplementary information, as of and for the years ended December 31, 2017 and 2016 together with auditor’s report).
[12] The treaty establishing the International Criminal Court came into force on 1 July, 2002.
[13] In addition to what has already been observed regarding the campaign for the establishment of the ICC and its ratification by the US government, two other examples can be given. The first is a personal testimony that dates back to my approximately two-month stay in New York in 2009. While attending the WFM headquarters, I decided to research the use of special drawing rights (SDRs) as a world currency. When I showed the results of my research to a team of to a team of WFM employees, including the then WFM Deputy Executive Director, the latter exclaimed “there is no need for a world currency, we already have one: the US dollar!”. The other example concerns (laudable) initiative in the field of global security supported by Australian federalist friends and other federalists spread across the American and European continents. The idea is to set up a “World Security Community of Democracies” which, in essence, takes up the idea put forward by Clarence Streit in the 1940s. The leadership of this coalition, it goes without saying, would fall to the United States.
Raising a problem, without suggesting how it might be overcome, leads nowhere. Therefore, two ideas are advanced here. The first could be to organise webinars on federalism, along the lines of the cadre schools that were organised in the past; these could be useful for world federalists, who tend to be unfamiliar with the federalist literature. The fact that, in the wake of the Covid pandemic, people are increasingly used to taking part in remote debates, suggests that this could be a good starting point. Another idea might be to bring together in Ventotene, for example every two years, during the traditional seminar, not so much the young people indicated by the WFM, but the leaders of the organisations that belong to the movement, some of whom are high-level and open to dialogue between federalist forces.
[14] M. Brauer, A. Bummel, A United Nations Parliamentary Assembly, Democracy Without Borders, Berlin, 2020, https://cdn.democracywithoutborders.org/files/DWB_UNPA_Policy_Review.pdf.
[15] Indicative, in this regard, is the admission made by the President of the WFM in the final session of the event, held in Brussels on 8 December 2022, jointly promoted by the UEF and the WFM to mark the 75th anniversary of the Montreux Declaration: that the WFM is still looking for its political course.
[16] This section largely draws on what was said during the “UEF-WFM cooperation” session of event marking the 75th anniversary of the Montreux Declaration.
[17] For a critique of the league of democracies idea, cf.: C.A. Kupchan, Minor League, Major Problems (The Case Against a League of Democracies), Foreign Affairs, November/December 2008, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/minor-league-major-problems.
[18] European Parliament, Hearing with High Representative/Vice-President-designate Josep Borrel, 7 October 2019, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190926IPR62260/hearing-with-high-representative-vice-president-designate-josep-borrell.
[19] V. Camporini, D. Moro, Verso la “dual army” europea: la proposta SPD del 28° esercito, Commento n. 201, Centro Studi sul Federalismo, November 2020, https://www.csfederalismo.it/it/pubblicazioni/commenti/verso-la-dual-army-europea-la-proposta-spd-del-28-esercito.
[20] The text submitted to the Congress position can be found in: Le X Congrès du M.F.E – Résolution présentée par Autonomie fédéraliste, Le Fédéraliste, 6 no. 1 (1964), p. 40, https://www.thefederalist.eu/site/index.php/fr/les-problemes-de-l-action/1185-le-x-congres-du-mfe-i-documents; also published in Italian in: M. Albertini, Tutti gli scritti, op. cit., Il Mulino, Bologna, pp. 595-597.
[21] The proposal was presented during the summit that the US organized with 49 African heads of government on 13-15 December 2022: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/12/15/vision-statement-for-the-u-s-africa-partnership/.
[22] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), EU military training missions: a synthesis report, Maggio 2022, in: https://www.sipri.org/publications/2022/other-publications/eu-military-training-missions-synthesis-report.
[23] A first step in this direction is the recent Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2444 of 12 December 2022 on a European Union military partnership mission in Niger (EUMPM Niger), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022D2444&from=IT.
[24] Economic Commission for Africa, ECA, African Ministers of Finance and IMF discuss changes needed to global financial architecture to support economic recovery on the continent, https://www.uneca.org/stories/eca%2C-african-ministers-of-finance-and-imf-discuss-changes-needed-to-global-financial.
[25] Cf.: A. Majocchi, Europa-Africa: una partnership per uno sviluppo sostenibile, Policy paper CSF, n. 50, April 2022, https://www.csfederalismo.it/images/policy_paper/CSF_PP50_Majocchi_EUROPA_E_AFRICA_Apr2022.pdf.
[26] C. Gritella, EU-AU at Sea: Towards a Euro-African Maritime Security Organisation?, Research paper, CSF, October 2021: https://www.csfederalismo.it/images/2021/05/PDF/CSF-RP_EU-AU-Maritime-Security_C-Gritella_Oct2021.pdf.
