Year LXV, 2023, Single Issue, Page 35
Europe and the Issue of Security.
The Urgency to Reform Europe
in a Changing International Context
CARLO MARIA PALERMO
GABRIELE FELICE MASCHERPA
FILIPPO BAGNARA
GIOVANNI SALPIETRO
Introduction
The Russian invasion of Ukraine, with all its political and economic repercussions, opened a new period of instability in continental Europe, and did so in a context already characterised by rising tensions on the international stage, in regions ranging from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East. Added to all this is the recent reignition of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, whose effects on the Mediterranean and on Europe remain to be quantified.[1]
The entire global strategic structure has been called into question: the Helsinki framework looks to be definitively compromised, while the declarations made by the Republican candidate for the presidency of the United States,[2] and also the evolution of US strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region,[3] suggest that we can no longer count on American assistance, which until now has been a pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.
Tensions over foreign policy and defence, and the tone of official statements by various European leaders,[4] are highlighting the lack of the institutional tools (both internal and external to the EU) needed to deal with this situation. Overall, this picture clearly shows that the framework established by the Treaty of Lisbon does not provide an adequate basis for responding to the challenges linked to the change in the international scenario and for addressing the international crises in Europe and the Mediterranean.[5] The current phase in the process of European integration, more than any of the previous ones, lays bare the urgency to overcome the existing institutional framework, and also the need to deepen political integration in the field of defence and foreign policy.
This essay is an attempt to highlight the contradictions of international politics and set out Europe’s position in today’s international scenario. In other words, we will try to understand the setting in which Europe has operated since the end of the Cold War and the emergencies that the European Union is now called upon to manage. To begin with, we will reflect upon the meaning of both unipolarity and the multipolarity that is currently in the making, and strive to understand the consequences, for Europe, of the growing international competition between the great continental powers; we will also reflect upon the need to provide a European response to American disengagement. We will then seek to analyse some of the EU’s security and defence mechanisms, drawing attention to areas where Europe relies on external players.
Another interesting aspect examined is the situation of Europe’s defence industry in the wake of the most recent international events and member states’ initiatives.
Finally, we will try to provide an overview of Europe’s current common foreign, security and defence policy scenario, focusing, in particular, on the issue of defence within the existing framework and on the need to reform the Treaties. Rather than a comprehensive analysis covering every aspect of the CSDP and the political and scientific debate around it, what is needed is a more in-depth analysis of this area, starting from the need to build a new political and institutional context — something that can be achieved only through serious reform of the EU Treaties.
2. International Relations Since the End of the Cold War
At the end of the Cold War, after the collapse of the bipolar system, the European states found themselves free to pursue their own foreign policy strategies, as long as these were aligned with US priorities. At the same time, Europe lost its strategic centrality, since it was no longer the ultimate theatre of global competition.
The start of the unipolar phase, with the collapse of Soviet hegemony in central Europe and the implosion of the Soviet Union, led to a redefining of the European continental order. The enlargements of NATO and the European Union were direct results of the power of attraction of, respectively, the prospect of US protection and the advantages offered by the European common market. These enlargements were based on the voluntary adhesion of sovereign states (which perceived a strong threat to their security in a changing and insecure scenario) to two overlapping intergovernmental systems — one, NATO, offering security, and the other, the fledgling EU, promising economic development.
Enlargement of the European Union, coinciding with a long period of attempts to strengthen it internally through reforms (an only partially achievable objective in the absence of a true European centre of power), was the only viable alternative to widespread regional instability and revanchist efforts. The tragedy of Yugoslavia provides an illustration, albeit on a small scale, of the risks that much of the continent faced at that time.
While the USA was strengthening its position as the sole superpower, and imposing a world order within which it was the global provider of security resources and guarantor of the economy and of trade, the Russian Federation, the state that had inherited what was left of Soviet power, was fighting against the risk of implosion.
In this phase, European defence, as a concept, meant nothing more than working to maintain stable relations between states within the US-led international community, and seeking to contain and possibly neutralise potential threats from nearby regional actors.
September 11, 2001, albeit without radically changing the structure of the international system, clearly showed that, in the unipolar world, the real threats came from state and non-state actors that were excluded from the system.[6]
This was a historical phase in which the Russian Federation positioned itself as a strategic partner of the USA and its allies in President George W. Bush’s so-called global war on terror; it was a phase that saw the USA striving, by every means possible, to prolong its supremacy, or rather hegemony[7] as vast sections of the non-European world saw it. Since the end of the Bush presidency, the consequences of his administration’s controversial policies in the Middle East have led to a crisis of this American hegemony and to the USA’s increasing disengagement from the world’s crisis spots. A constant feature of Obama’s presidency, for example, was his administration’s support for multilateralism, seen as an element helping to foster a sharing of international responsibilities. In this regard, we need only cite the Iranian nuclear negotiations, which saw the United States clearly positioning itself as the facilitator of a political enterprise that also involved other major powers, i.e., China, Russia, the European Union (through the High Representative), in the role of joint guarantors of a general agreement. The US support for multipolarism was also meant to reassure the international community and major regional players that the United States no longer had any intention of acting in ways that would lead to instability. On the contrary, it was clearly the beginning of a trend towards disengagement by the United States which, after two presidencies characterised by an interventionist approach to international relations (those of Clinton and, even more so, of G.W. Bush), was starting to want to share the burden of security in many world regions and in many crisis situations.[8]
The Emergence of a Multipolar International System.
Since the USA took this strategic step back, we have been in a phase of transition towards multipolarism, which will change international life. In this phase, the sphere of international relations is seeing the emergence of continental powers, and the creation of a multipolar international system in which the biggest of these powers are beginning to play a role. However, since this system is still in the process of becoming established, the continental powers involved are, for now, still in competition with one another.
It is interesting, from this perspective, to look at how the role of the Russian Federation has evolved following its moment of disillusionment[9] and the phase of strategic and political decline that, culminating in the crisis of the 1990s and early 2000s, saw it responding to pressure from the Atlantic Alliance by implementing a significant strategic retreat. In the period between then and 2022, it managed to rebuild and modernise its military capacity, and to respond to the crisis of the 2000s by acting in the ex-Soviet world (i.e., Russia’s “near abroad”) both militarily (through its war of aggression against Georgia) and diplomatically (through its role in the establishment of the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Union,[10] and its membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, or “Shanghai Group”, and the BRICS group). Its role in the war in Syria was significant, too, as was its intervention in Libya; indeed, Russia’s ability to destabilise large parts of Africa[11] showed its capacity to act even outside its reference framework, which in turn boosted its aspiration to be a “superpower” and not just a large regional power.
In February 2022, with the start of its war of aggression against Ukraine (which followed its 2014 destabilisation operation), Russia opened a new phase in European history, dealing what is probably a lethal blow to the Helsinki system that has guaranteed peace in Europe since 1975. In so doing, it sent out a clear message regarding both its ambitions and the overall international scenario.
China, on the other hand, took a different approach. After recording uninterrupted growth in the 1980s and 1990s, the new century saw it entering a phase of economic consolidation and beginning to give substance to its strategic ambitions. While, together with the Russian Federation, it had been criticising the unipolar international system since the 1990s, and clearly favoured a multipolar form of organisation of international coexistence,[12] from the 2000s it began, mainly by exploiting its soft power, to enter various other contexts.
China, like Russia, certainly supported “alternative” multilateral organisations such as the “Shanghai Group” and the BRICS group, but it also proved capable, again through multilateralist means, of setting up the Belt and Road Initiative,[13] which has geopolitical ends, an endeavour in which it was helped by a dense diplomatic web stretching from Asia to Europe, and also reaching Africa, as well as by ad hoc international organisations, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investments Bank (AIIB).[14]
Furthermore, in Africa, Chinese power triggered an extensive investment programme, likely to directly affect the development of countries there,[15] and the creation of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), a true ad hoc international organisation that, while its main role is to oversee Chinese investments in Africa (in a multilateral context), is also starting to carry out tasks of a military nature, albeit ones linked to supply chains and, therefore, to the market.
It is also interesting to consider the foreign policy line taken by China on the Russian invasion of Ukraine: in its position statement, it seems to acknowledge the intangibility of the borders of sovereign states, but also the admissibility of Russian ambitions.[16] This is an ambiguous position, because while China implicitly recognises (albeit without condemning) the violations committed by Russia, it cannot, partly for domestic reasons, suspend its alliance with its neighbour.
These are the key actors involved in the process of transition towards a multipolar order, and they are therefore the ones with the greatest capacity to influence Europe on both a strategic and an economic level. However, other countries — we can cite India, Asian countries like Malaysia and Indonesia, as well as South Africa, Brazil and the Gulf states — are also starting to play important roles, each according to its rank and within its own context of reference, and thus to question the leading role played by the West in the field of international relations. This is an important reality that helps to clarify the nature of the challenges facing Europe in the coming years.
Europe and the Age of Insecurity.
As explained above, we have entered a phase of transition (from the unipolar to a multipolar order) which has consequences for international security. From the perspective of international coexistence, and for the European Union in particular, this situation is therefore a critical issue.
The first consequence is the competition that is arising between the main global powers, which is clearly an element bound to influence international coexistence. We need only think of that which has emerged (between NATO and Russia) in Europe since the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, and of the current rivalry between the United States and China in the Pacific.
Another consequence is the growing emergence and consolidation, in different parts of the world, of regional systems, each with its own internal logic and its own international security dynamics, dissociated from global logics.[17] This is a trend that fits in with the phenomenon of international fragmentation.[18] Take what was happening in the Middle East prior to 7 October, 2023, for example, namely the construction of a regional balance of power, based on a “détente” between Saudi Arabia and Iran,[19] supported by Israel, which for its part, through the Abraham Accords,[20] was attempting to normalise its relations with the Arab world. And, also, what is happening in South East Asia with the creation of AUKUS, the (essentially anti-Chinese) alliance that has been formed between Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom.
All this adds up to an evolving situation that the Europeans would do well to monitor closely, not least because of the repercussions that international competition can have on globalisation and international trade relations, which of course are fundamentally important for EU member states.
A third consequence is the tendency to re-arm. Major powers, such as China and the Russian Federation in particular, have stepped up their re-armament programmes; and middle-sized regional powers, too, such as Saudi Arabia, have drastically increased their military capabilities.[21]
These are fundamental aspects of international coexistence that, along with the current international crises (primarily the war in Ukraine, but also the tensions in the Middle East since 7 October 2023), Europe needs to carefully evaluate, both at EU and member state level.
3. Common Security and Defence Policies: Limits and Outlook
In the Saint-Malo declaration, the European Union, following the bloody parenthesis of the wars in Yugoslavia,[22] and during the war in Kosovo, affirmed the “need to give the European Union (EU) the capacity for autonomous decision-making and action, backed up by credible military forces.”[23] Since then, Europe has managed to achieve some important objectives in this regard. These include the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the Political and Security Committee (PSC), and the institutionalisation of the role of High Representative for Foreign Policy and Security, a figure who, since the Treaty of Lisbon, also fulfils that of Vice-President of the Commission.
By the end of 2016, 36 international missions had taken place under the framework of the CSDP (19 in Africa, 7 in the Balkans and 10 in other regions), with the first three (the only completely military ones) proving crucial in stabilising the Balkans area, in line with the commitments made by the Union in the previous decade.[24]
The other missions were of a civil-military nature, mainly involved civilian personnel, and played a valuable role in meeting peace-enforcement needs in delicate areas such as Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, Palestine (Gaza and the West Bank), Mali and Libya. They were important actions for the stabilisation of these regions, and achieved remarkable results.[25] Other important missions were those carried out on the eastern flank of the Union, in Ukraine[26] for example, and the EUNAVFOR Med mission, serving to protect maritime traffic.[27]
However, interventions of this kind cannot meet the complex needs that face Europe in the present, delicate, historical phase: indeed, CSDP missions are conducted pursuant to Article 43(1) TEU, which places specific operational limits on them.[28]
There may be greater room for manoeuvre in the context of emergencies of a military nature, as envisaged by Article 42 TEU, but two important constraints remain: the first is certainly the need for unanimity, which makes it difficult to reach an agreement between the member states (especially given the prospect of EU enlargement to 35 countries); the second is the question of funding, given that the freedom for manoeuvre within the EU’s current institutional framework is not sufficient to allow the funding of a revised common foreign and security policy, adequate to address the priorities imposed by the new historical phase and the new era of European insecurity.
The EU’s Dependence on External Actors.
As we have seen in the previous paragraphs, the end of the Cold War forced Europe to review its own strategic structure on the basis of (among other things) the new nature of the international system, which had changed from bipolar to unipolar.
In this new setting, Europe was faced with the effects of the wars in Yugoslavia and the emergence of new transnational threats from non-state actors, as shown by the events of September 11. The most tangible sign of the changing international scenario was the enlargement of the European Union, and even more so of the North Atlantic Alliance.
Within NATO, the armed forces of the European states that were already members of the organisation, and of the former Warsaw Pact countries that had joined it, were forced to restructure and raise their game in order to be able to cope with the tasks that fell to them in the new scenario: internal security, counter-terrorism, peace enforcement and peace keeping. “Hard” security resources (strategic deterrence, power projection), on the other hand, were provided at low cost by the USA.
However, the difficulties encountered by the USA in various theatres, and the expansion of the area in which it found itself waging its so-called war on terror, led to a turning point.
In the wake of the crisis of the global economic system, Obama’s election in 2008 ushered in a new American administration. The same year also saw the first intervention by Russia’s armed forces outside Russian territory (the invasion of Georgia). This period also brought increasing instability in North Africa and the Middle East (the Arab Spring) and saw China strengthening its position as a challenger in the Asia-Pacific area and potentially as a global hegemon.
During the latter part of the world’s unipolar phase, the emergence of China and Russia coincided with the election to the White House of Donald Trump, who made US disengagement a pillar of his programme.
More recently, the invasion of Ukraine has brought a return of large-scale warfare to the European continent and exposed the fragility of European security mechanisms, which, subordinated to those of the United States, were designed for a system now superseded.
In 2024, Europe is faced with two enormous security challenges that will determine its fate and change the world balance.
The first, given the risk of an end to the strategic convergence between the United States and Europe, concerns the role of the USA as provider of security resources at zero cost to Europe: declarations made at the beginning of the electoral campaign, as well as the experience of the previous Trump administration, raise the very real prospect of a reduction, in various ways, of the USA’s commitment to NATO, which would mean less deterrence and a substantial decrease in the alliance’s operational capacity. Trump has already railed against “criminal” states that benefit from the security resources of NATO, i.e., of the USA, without bearing the financial, human and material costs involved in its activity.
The scenarios that could unfold should Trump win a second mandate and carry out his threats are numerous: we might plausibly see a reduction in the USA’s presence in Europe without formal changes to the organisational framework of the alliance, or alternatively the USA might completely withdraw from the military structure while remaining a member of the alliance (along the lines of the precedent set by France in 1966 when it withdrew from the NATO Military Command Structure alone). Lastly, an unlikely but not impossible scenario is that of the USA formally rescinding its membership of NATO, a move that would mean the immediate end of the alliance.
In any of the above scenarios, the problem that arises, both for the European states and for the European Union, is how to build a strategic alternative that is credible as a source of deterrence and credible operationally, both in the sphere of international relations and in that of military operations, both conventional and nuclear.
The second security challenge is posed by the alarming pressure exerted by the Russian Federation on neighbouring European countries, especially the Nordic states, the Baltic states and Poland. Several analysts have noted both an increase in Russian forces and in Russia’s preparations for a possible conflict involving the Europeans and NATO.[29] Specifically, the threat concerns the territorial integrity of the Baltic republics, which are particularly disadvantaged given that, geographically, they are wedged between three pro-Russian territories: the Kaliningrad oblast, Belarus and Russia itself.
The likelihood of an attack on Europe’s eastern front depends on the progress of the ongoing war in Ukraine and how the political situation in the USA evolves. Nevertheless, Russia, counting on a fragmented response, could potentially decide to take a risk: in the event of an attack on one or more countries, the collective reaction unleashed could be either massive or more limited, and in the event of US disengagement, it would fall to the Europeans to react alone and with their own forces. In this latter eventuality the Europeans would be at a clear disadvantage as their supply lines are extremely scarce, while their arsenals have been emptied to arm Ukraine.
In short, there would be a recurrence of scenarios already widely described by the authors of The Federalist[30] in relation to the American War of Independence, when the perception of the threat differed greatly between the confederal states, so much so that those geographically distant from the conflict managed to avoid providing the military forces requested by the Continental Congress.
In the case in question, the European Union is clearly an extremely advanced confederation with elements borrowed from other federal unions (e.g., its currency); from a defence point of view, however, it is less cohesive and less organised as the states are already in a defensive alliance with an external hegemonic power, and moreover continue to guard their military sovereignty extremely jealously.
4. The Defence Industry
The strategic autonomy of the EU goes hand in hand with that of its defence industry, and in recent months the largest outbreak of symmetrical warfare on European soil since the end of the Second World War has exposed the inadequacy of our military-industrial system.
A quick look at the figures is enough to confirm this: in 2023 the EU member states collectively produced around 500,000 artillery shells[31] (mainly 155-mm rounds), however, the International Institute for Strategic Studies[32] estimates that Ukraine, depending on its offensive effort, will require between 75,000 and 250,000 per month in 2024. These are numbers typical of a high-intensity conflict, and are more than sufficient to ensure that the ammunition supplies of a country like France “would not last more than a few weeks” according to the Assemblée Nationale’s National Defence and Armed Forces Committee.[33] Such a level of unpreparedness, which extends beyond the volume of artillery shells, is the result of protracted and systematic delegation of European security policy to the United States of America. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War and more than two decades of asymmetrical conflicts have led to a change in most NATO countries’ engagement doctrines: no contingent in Afghanistan or Iraq has ever needed large volumes of artillery munitions, to fight off other MBTs or to defend against cruise missiles and drones. Consequently, no one has ever thought about preparing for a symmetrical conflict in which the forces in the field possess comparable numbers and technologies.
To complete the picture, there has been, and continues to be, a complete aversion among much of the European political class to the development of a defence culture, and this is especially true in Italy. Indeed, how can we fail to mention the first renderings of the Italian navy’s new multipurpose offshore patrol vessels (PPAs). At the time of the approval of the 2014 Naval Programme, these 4,500-ton warships (empty weight) had Red Cross containers attached to their sides. Why? As a way of convincing our political decision-makers that second-line frigates like these are primarily instruments for assisting civilian populations in the event of natural disasters,[34] albeit ones also equipped for warfare.
The legacy that this whole historical and political context has left us is a fragmented European defence industry, inefficient and prey to the most vulgar nationalisms. The EU Commission’s new strategy for the European defence industry (March 2024) is an excellent starting point for efforts to understand what is not working, and what needs to be done to prepare the member states to build a deterrence that is credible, at least in technological and production terms.
The EU certainly does not lack an industrial base, quite the contrary. Its problem is the chronic lack of cooperation when it comes to developing new equipment, together with the modest size of the companies operating in the sector. None of the top ten manufacturers of weapon systems in the world is European[35] (apart from Britain’s BAE Systems), and whenever any attempt is made to merge the realities of different member states to better compete with the American and Chinese giants, the usual national selfishness almost always prevails. The failed merger between Fincantieri and STX Europe (now Chantiers de l’Atlantique), two of the three largest European shipyards, is a case in point. Basically, having nationalised STX in 2017, in 2021 the French government, following protracted and difficult negotiations, decided to scupper the agreement, simply to keep its national flagbearer out of Italian clutches.[36] This therefore put paid to the opportunity to create, by concentrating know-how, assets (such as STX’s vast dry docks) and capital, a potentially global player. In view of the numerous choices of this kind, dictated by nationalism (and numerous bureaucratic barriers), we should not be surprised to find that only 18 per cent of investments in new equipment in the EU between 2021 and 2022 were collaborative efforts.[37] Even more masochistic is the lack of cooperation in the development of new weapon systems, even in the face of similar requirements, as exemplified by the dualism between the GCAP[38] (Global Combat Air Programme) and FCAS[39] (Future Combat Air System) programmes. Over the next 10/15 years, Europe’s main air forces (those of France, Germany, Italy and Spain) will need to replace their advanced fourth-generation fighter planes (Eurofighter Typhoons, in the case of Italy, Germany and Spain, and France’s Dassault Rafale aircraft) with sixth-generation aircraft. Developing such a weapon system is fundamental to maintaining technological superiority over China and Russia, and, being extraordinarily expensive and complex, it requires the combined resources and know-how of multiple countries. In developing a sixth-generation fighter it is advisable to have on board a country, such as Italy, extensively involved in the F-35 programme (the only fifth-generation Western fighter assembled outside the USA), in order to more easily bridge the gap between the fourth and sixth generations. Instead, France, Spain and Germany have decided to proceed with the FCAS, while Italy is participating in the GCAP alongside the United Kingdom and Japan, also countries with a wealth of significant experience with fifth-generation planes (the F-35 and the Japanese F-X). It goes without saying that the FCAS’s prospects of success are not particularly great.
This fragmentation, exacerbated by the lower technological level achieved and the duplication of weapon systems, also leads to lower output compared with what is produced by American and Asian counterparts, which means high costs per unit and long delivery times. This applies to almost all weapon systems and ammunition made in the EU. The result of all this? Between the time of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and June 2023, more than 75 per cent of military equipment purchases by EU member states were made outside the Union (and of these, 63 per cent were made in the United States).[40] With a further high-intensity symmetrical conflict in Europe now a real possibility, it is hardly surprising that a country like Poland prefers to rely on the United States and South Korea, rather than risk becoming caught up in European industrial inefficiencies.
The EU Commission’s strategy aims to increase the capabilities of the European defence industry through collaborative investment, research, development, production and procurement within the Union. Indeed, according to the strategy, member states should start buying weapons together, and above all should do so in Europe: by 2030 at least 50 per cent of the member states’ budget for purchasing military equipment (rising to 60 per cent by 2035) will have to go to EU-based suppliers, and at least 40 per cent of purchases will have to be collaborative ones.[41] In concrete terms, the Commission wants to implement a new mechanism for European military acquisitions, inspired by the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme[42] through which Washington concludes contracts directly with other governments. Obviously, the United Kingdom is excluded from the equation, to the delight of the leaders of the GCAP and the Italian company Leonardo, which has a strong presence in the UK.
The strategy, however, runs into several problems. First, the laughable 1.5-billion-euro budget (linked to the European Defence Fund) that, moreover, depends on negotiations between the EU parliament and the member states, which are already making noises about Commission interference liable to undermine their national sovereignty, in a delicate area like defence to boot. In short, the Commission’s wishes appear to be incompatible with the intergovernmental model and its usual limits, and while this continues to be the case the European defence industry will continue to suffer.
5. Defence: Europe’s Institutional Framework
Strategic Autonomy.
The defence of the Union (as an organisation) plus that of the member states does not equal European defence.
In past decades, any “defence” initiative formulated by the states, and in rare cases carried through to completion, was not really designed to defend Europe, only to contribute to a system in which security was already guaranteed from the outside.
Such initiatives, limited in both their means and their ambitions, arose at a time when general security was guaranteed by the unipolar hegemon; in this setting, Russia, rather than a competitor, acted as a severe but generous partner, and the threats to be dealt with were acts of terrorism and minor crises. For this reason, the military interventions carried out were peace-enforcement, peace-keeping, and international policing operations.
The military missions carried out abroad by member states (notably France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain) were essentially circumscribed security missions, complementary to other multilateral missions conducted under the aegis of the European Union or NATO, or to other multilateral collaborations. And for the states involved, they took the place of true foreign policies. The stabilisation missions in the region of the former Yugoslavia were all possible only because they were conducted in a framework created by the massive intervention of the hegemonic player.
All the tools available to the Union, theoretically usable once the obstacle of the necessary unanimous vote in the Council has been overcome, are obsolete; they are also insufficient, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in the face of the growing risk of a large-scale war (conventional, hybrid and nuclear) that is threatening, in different ways, both the member states and the very stability of the Union.
The 12,000-strong European Rapid Operational Force (EUROFOR), created in 1995 and decommissioned in 2012 since it lacked the necessary numbers — the 1999 NATO mission in Kosovo required 60,000 personnel — and logistical support, would not have been able to fulfil, on its own, the peace-enforcement and peace-keeping tasks assigned to it under its mandate.[43]
The EU’s European Battlegroups, created along the lines of the similar integrated resources that exist within NATO, were designed to fulfil specific military tasks that, in the future, the Council might identify for them. However, it is important to appreciate that the type of engagement of forces of this kind depends on the fact that they are made available by a coalition within an interstate cooperation framework, and also on the EU’s political and strategic acephaly.
The Military Staff of the European Union (EUMS) was formally created under the 2003 Treaty of Nice by modifying structures previously created within the WEU (Western European Union). The EUMS is an imitation of the General Staff of NATO, although the EU lacks the latter’s dimensions (in terms of resources and personnel) and political leadership.
For European states, defence policy is actually something that is developed and implemented within the Atlantic Alliance, a context in which they assume responsibilities individually and not as members of the European Union. Various initiatives within NATO or multilateral frameworks derive their strength both from the voluntary political commitment of the participating states and from the readiness of the latter to fulfil the commitments they have made. But in a hypothetical scenario where there is a threat to the foundations of the existence of just one Alliance member state, it is unrealistic to imagine that the goodwill of the less threatened allies can be counted upon.
As things currently stand, the Europeans are lacking in various areas, in which, therefore, they rely directly on their main partner/ally, the USA, and to a lesser extent on other actors, such as Asian countries (for supplies of electronic equipment and components) or the Gulf states (for energy supplies).
Although the EU is abreast of other players as regards its ability to transport goods and people within its own territory, and has important global trade hubs, it is dramatically lacking in terms of its ability to move large military units, deploy them to theatres of operations, and supply them for the time necessary to complete missions. The contribution of the USA, in both substantial (means and infrastructure) and organisational (command) terms, is fundamental. Even for limited interventions conducted in circumscribed areas at the heart of Europe (Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia), US resources were fundamental both in starting and in completing the operations.
Another vital issue for Europe (be this taken to mean the Union, the common market, or the member states) is the protection of its maritime supply and trade routes. The blockage of the Suez Canal in 2021 and the problems of political instability and piracy in the Red Sea and around the Horn of Africa show just how vulnerable the European economy, because of its dependence on shipping, really is.
Currently, even the protection of European maritime zones, although entrusted to member states, is partially coordinated within the framework of NATO. For example, the EUNAVFOR Aspides naval mission,[44] promoted by the EU, which rightly considers the security of the maritime routes in the Red Sea to be crucial, is possible only because of the presence in the area of the multilateral US-led Prosperity Guardian mission, in which some of the units linked to EUNAVFOR Aspides are involved. The EU-led mission nevertheless has its own units and command structure pursuing its own military goals.
Were the United States of America to decide, unilaterally and in accordance with its own raison d’état, to move the permanently stationed naval forces currently protecting Europe to Asia, the Europeans would immediately be deprived of a formidable instrument of protection and projection of power, which cannot be replaced simply by pooling the forces of the national navies, conceived to protect the single national interest or to be implemented in a multilateral context, complementary to the forces of the Atlantic Alliance.
Today, post Brexit, only one European state is equipped with strategic nuclear submarines (four operational) and only two with aircraft carriers. If we consider the different US fleets and the structure of the US Navy’s battlegroups, which are built around aircraft carriers, the comparison with Europe’s resources is stark.
As clearly illustrated by the ongoing situation in Ukraine, there are certain resources that, being crucial in guaranteeing the maintenance of an organised political community and in safeguarding the lives of citizens, are particularly vulnerable to attack. Energy infrastructures and communication infrastructures are fundamental and must be protected as an absolute priority in order to guarantee the functioning of other systems. Europe’s peacetime policies are underpowered to protect these fundamental resources, and the EU has no tools with which to defend itself in times of war. Under the Treaty on European Union, it is the states themselves that are responsible for the defence of their territory, while other spaces, such as outer space, are left for civilian use or for initiatives by individual states. In this regard, both the Americans and their adversaries, namely the Russians and the Chinese, are showing more foresight. Recognising the inevitability of the militarisation of space, they are all endeavouring to adopt adequate tools.
Over the past 25 years, the United States has invested heavily in military command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I), a dimension in which the Europeans have no significant role to play. Today, the interception centres, satellite control centres and satellite networks are all the prerogative of the United States, possibly in collaboration with its allies (Great Britain, Australia). Moreover, there is a lack of autonomous European structures for data collection and processing, not to mention a fragmentation of intelligence between Europe’s various member states.
Contemporary war scenarios, characterised by a high rate of digitalisation and automation, are particularly unfavourable for the Europeans, who, in this sphere too, are wholly ill equipped to defend themselves.
The Need for Institutional Reform.
Time and the international context are working against the Europeans. In the event of a major crisis, the only tools at their disposal are the traditional ones of the member states and their system of alliances, since defence powers and resources are still entirely in the hands of the states, with all the drawbacks that this entails.
The creation of alternative instruments will require a change, partial or complete, to the institutional structure of the Union.
A parliamentary working group of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) proposed creating what has been dubbed the 28th army,[45] i.e., a limited military instrument, independent of the states’ armed forces and subject to the orders of the Commission under the political control of the European Parliament; yet even this proposal, which has become a dead letter, would not be achievable without changes to the Treaties.
The question that must be addressed if we are to overcome all the challenges to the collective security of the continent is therefore the institutional one, otherwise any proposed solution will continue to face insurmountable obstacles.
Paradoxically, instead of immediately creating a so-called European army, parallel to the national ones but with no political leadership or own resources, a European Union equipped with federal instruments, such as a government with political power, democratic accountability and fiscal leverage, could efficiently direct the armed forces of the 27 member states during the phase of transition towards the construction of a unified defence system.
Clearly, the question of how, in detail, a hypothetical European defence system might be structured goes beyond the scope of this text. However, since it is closely linked to the reform of the Treaties and the issues that emerged in the final report of the Conference on the Future of Europe, the theme of defence must be made part of the debate to be conducted by future Convention envisaged by Article 48 of the TEU.
Conclusions
The EU faces a political scenario heavily conditioned by European insecurity, and it needs, more urgently today than at previous junctures, to provide autonomously for its own security.
Alongside the ongoing war in Ukraine, with the need to support the Ukrainian effort both politically and militarily, there remain the consequences of other crises, starting with the tensions in the Middle East and the Gulf of Aden. The difficulties, however, are not confined to evaluation of the regional context, but also concern the technical capabilities of the European Union and the individual member states in the field of defence.
Nationalisms and national interests have conditioned the military capabilities of the European Union and significantly limited the interoperability of its weapon systems. Even though the Union has equipped itself with potentially useful instruments such as the EDF,[46] the inclination to jointly develop military technologies has been far lower than expected, leaving the European states in a position of extraordinary weakness, both in the framework of international coexistence, and in that of regional challenges, ranging from Ukraine’s survival to the issue of supply chain security.
Deterrence is another open topic. Indeed, the issue of strategic autonomy and deterrence has returned to the fore for two reasons: the end of the era in which security was linked to disarmament treaties, and now the ongoing conflict with a nuclear power. In the wake of Brexit, France is the only EU member state with its own nuclear capacity, while others participate in nuclear sharing programmes with the USA. The scenarios that are opening up today are making it essential to reflect upon the question of an autonomous European deterrent and on the sovereign control of such a device.
The institutional reforms needed to allow the Union to equip itself with credible security tools go beyond the sphere of intergovernmental coordination or the community method as they touch on issues of sovereignty, namely legitimacy, coercive power and fiscal power, which are the very foundations of statehood. To achieve this objective, it is essential to move towards a change in the Treaties that addresses the issues raised by the emerging international context, as well as the need (especially now that we no longer have the certainties of the Cold War period and the era of American unipolarity) to ensure real political guidance of Europe’s foreign and security policy.
[1] Obviously, we are thinking about the impact on supply chains of the persistent threat of Houthi attacks on commercial ships. See Duci, G., Mar Rosso: porti mediterranei a rischio bypass, ISPI/Commentary, https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/mar-rosso-porti-mediterranei-a-rischio-bypass-165404.
[2] Sanger, E., NATO Weighs Isolation After Trump Outburst, The New York Times, February, 12, 2024, Section A, p. 1.
[3] Among other sources, we suggest: Obama, B., Speech by President Obama to the Australian Parliament, Office of the Press Secretary, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament; Jackson, V., Relational Peace versus Pacific Primacy: Configuring US Strategy for Asia’s Regional Order, Asian Politics & Policy, https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12675.
[4] Remarks by Executive Vice-President Vestager, High Representative/Vice-President Borrell, and Commissioner Breton at the Press Conference on the European Defence Industrial Strategy and the European Defence Industry Programme, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_24_1327; Calcutt, C., Macron Stands by Remarks about Sending Troops to Ukraine, Politico, https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-ukraine-western-troops-remarks; Nubert, K., German SPD’s Lead EU Candidate Sparks Debate on EU Nuclear Warheads, Euractiv, 24 February 2024 (updated 16 February 2024), https://www.euractiv.com/section/elections/news/german-spds-lead-eu-candidate-sparks-debate-on-eu-nuclear-warheads.
[5] Pirozzi, N., A Treaty Change for the European Defence Union, IAI Commentaries, 21 April 2023, https://www.iai.it/it/pubblicazioni/treaty-change-european-defence-union.
[6] Barnett, T.P.M., War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century, London, Routledge, 2014.
[7] Dehio, L., Gleichgewicht oder Egemonie, Krefeld, Scherpe Verlag, 1948, English translation: The precarious balance: the politics of power in Europe 1494-1945, London, Chatto & Windus, 1962.
[8] Gates, R. M. (2010), Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance, Foreign Affairs, 89, n.3 (May/June) (2010), pp. 2-6.
[9] Turner, S., Russia, China and Multipolar World Order: The Danger in the Undefined, Asian Perspective, 33 n. 1 (2009), pp. 159-184.
[10] Nikitin, A., Russian Foreign Policy in the Fragmented Post-Soviet Space, International Journal on World Peace, 25 n. 2 (2008), pp. 7-31.
[11] Gopaldas, R., Will the Invasion of Ukraine Change Russia-Africa Relations?, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2023, pp. 11-15, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/04/26/will-invasion-of-ukraine-change-russia-africa-relations-pub-89596; Ramani, S., Russia and China in Africa: Prospective Partners or Asymmetric Rivals?, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) Policy Insights, 120, December 2021, https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Policy-Insights-120-ramani.pdf.
[12] Turner, S., Russia, China and Multipolar World Order…, op. cit., pp. 159-184.
[13] Palermo, C.M., Belt and Road Initiative, la politica estera cinese e le opportunità per l’Europa, Il Federalista, 60 n. 1 (2018), pp. 43-50.
[14] Ibidem.
[15] Shinn D.H., Eisenman, J., China’s Relations with Africa, New York, Columbia University Press, 2023.
[16] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis, 2023, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230224_11030713.html. The same position has been carried by the Chinese diplomacy since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Cfr. Zhang Jun (Chinese Ambassador to the UN) within UN 58th and 59th (AM & PM) General Assembly Meetings, February 23, 2022, https://press.un.org/en/2022/ga12403.doc.htm; UN Security Council, 8974th Meeting, SC/14803, February, 23, 2022, https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc14803.doc.htm; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Remarks by Ambassador Zhang Jun at the Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Ukraine, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/202203/t20220301_10646521.html; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Yang Jiechi Meets with US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202203/t20220315_10651810.html; Xinhua (Press Agency), Chinese, Russian FMs hold phone conversation, https://english.news.cn/20220224/e5c271a213db463d9e1c97336f1f2399/c.html (24.02.2022).
[17] Buzan, B., Waever, O., Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
[18] Clark, I., Globalisation and Fragmentation, Oxford, Oxford University Press,1997.
[19] Palermo, C.M., Accordo Arabia Saudita-Iran, L’Unità Europea, n. 2, (2023).
[20] Vakil, S., Quilliam, N., The Abraham Accords and Israel–UAE Normalization, Chatham House Research Papers, 2023, https://www.doi.org/10.55317/9781784135584.
[21] Dataset SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2022, https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2022.
[22] Di Nolfo, E., Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2015.
[23] Franco–British St. Malo Declaration (4 December, 1998), https://www.cvce.eu/obj/franco_british_st_malo_declaration_4_december_1998-en-f3cd16fb-fc37-4d52-936f-c8e9bc80f24f.html.
[24] Howorth, J., The European Union’s Security and Defence Policy: The Quest for Purpose, in Hill, C., Smith, M., Vanhoonacker, S., (eds.) International Relations of the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017.
[25] Zandee, D., Hoebeke, H., Merket, H., Meijnders, M., The EU as a security actor in Africa, Cligendael Monitor, 2016, https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2015/clingendael_monitor_2016_en/2_the_eu_as_a_security_actor_in_africa/.
[26] Rieppola, M., The EU Advisory mission Ukraine: Normative or Strategic Objectives?, EU Diplomacy Papers, College of Europe, 2017.
[27] Cfr. Operation IRINI, EUNAVFOR MED Website, https://www.operationirini.eu.
[28] Cf. Articles 42(1) and 43(1) of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX per cent3A12012M per cent2FTX.
[29] Institute for the Study of War, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 4, 2024. https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-4-2024.
[30] Hamilton, A., Madison, J., Jay, J.; Smith, Goldwin (ed.). The Federalist. New York, The Colonial Press, 1901.
[31] Deutsch, A., Lopakta, J., Inside Europe’s Drive to Get Ammunition to Ukraine as Russia Advances, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/inside-europes-drive-get-ammunition-ukraine-russia-advances-2024-03-06.
[32] Gady, F.-S., Kofman, N., Making Attrition Work: A Viable Theory of Victory for Ukraine, International Institute for Strategic Studies, https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/online-analysis/survival-online/2024/01/66-1-gady-and-kofman.pdf.
[33] Pietralunga, C., French Military Lacks Ammunition for High-Intensity Conflict, Le Monde, 23 April 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2023/02/18/french-military-lacks-ammunition-for-high-intensity-conflict_6016329_5.html.
[34] Ministero della Difesa, Marina militare, Programma navale 2014, https://www.marina.difesa.it/noi-siamo-la-marina/mezzi/nuoviprogetti/Pagine/programma_navale.aspx.
[35] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The SIPRI Top 100 Arms-Producing and Military Services Companies in the World, 2022, https://www.sipri.org/visualizations/2023/sipri-top-100-arms-producing-and-military-services-companies-world-2022.
[36] Zanon, M., Ai cantieri di Saint-Nazaire non vogliono più gli italiani, Il Foglio, 29 December 2020, https://www.ilfoglio.it/esteri/2020/12/29/news/ai-cantieri-di-saint-nazaire-non-vogliono-piu-gli-italiani-1608837/.
[37] Besch, S., Understanding the EU’s New Defense Industrial Strategy, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 8 March 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/2024/03/08/understanding-eu-s-new-defense-industrial-strategy-pub-91937.
[38] An ambitious timetable to deliver the newest world’s fighter jet, Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/aca4f3f0-f9bd-4d96-9928-febb13da6513.
[39] Airbus, Future Combat Air System (FCAS), https://www.airbus.com/en/products-services/defence/multi-domain-superiority/future-combat-air-system-fcas.
[40] Besch, S., Understanding the EU’s New Defense Industrial Strategy, op. cit..
[41] Ibidem.
[42] Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Foreign Military Sales (FMS), https://www.dsca.mil/foreign-military-sales-fms.
[43] Clementi, M., L’Europa e il mondo. La politica estera, di sicurezza e di difesa europea, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2004.
[44] Cf. EEAS, Operation Aspides mission page, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eunavfor-operation-aspides_en.
[45] AG Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik SPD-Bundestagsfraktion, Diskussionspapier 28. Armee, Berlin, 06.10.2020 https://augengeradeaus.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/20201006_SPD-AGSV_Diskussionspapier_28Armee.pdf.
[46] European Defence Fund.
