Year LXV, 2023, Single Issue, Page 17
The EU’s geopolitical priorities: Africa and the Mediterranean
DOMENICO MORO
The aim of Europe’s Green Deal strategy, namely to reach a carbon-free economy by 2050, has to date been discussed solely from the perspective of what the single national governments can do to eliminate carbon dioxide emissions, as though this policy were entirely unrelated to Europe’s relations with the rest of the world: but this is not the case. The Green Deal objective provides evidence, once again, that the world (and this applies to Europe in particular) is growing ever more interdependent, and that economic policies, even those of continental-size political communities, have to take these global relations into account. From the perspective of its carbon-free objective, the EU’s relations with not just the Middle East and Asia, but also Africa, are crucial.
Given the long-term framework of the Green Deal, which refers to the period up to 2050, EU-Africa relations need to be analysed from two angles, which are interrelated: policy on fossil fuels and renewable energy sources, and security policy. From the energy policy perspective, it should be kept in mind that the EU will have to rely on fossil energy for several decades to come, after which it will be reliant on renewable energy that it will not be producing entirely autonomously. From the security policy angle, on the other hand, the war in Ukraine, by exposing Germany and Italy’s strong dependence on Russian natural gas, has clearly illustrated the link that exists between energy supplies and foreign/security policy. The EU, to end its dependence on Russian gas, has begun importing more natural gas from other parts of the world, such as Azerbaijan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola and Mozambique, yet this choice is complicated by the revival of old conflicts in these areas, such as the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan,[1] and the ignition of new ones, in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, for example.
But it is also necessary to consider the global ramifications of the link between security policy and energy, which are precisely why China has strengthened its political-economic ties with the African continent. Yet such ramifications affect not only China but also the United States.
These two continents, however, have chosen to go down different routes. In 2011, China depended on foreign supplies of oil and natural gas for 64 per cent and 24 per cent of its domestic consumption respectively, whereas by 2021, these shares had risen to 74 per cent and 43 per cent respectively.[2] China, therefore, like the EU, is keen to see political stability in the parts of the world that supply energy.
The USA, on the other hand, faced with its growing inability to ensure world order, has opted to pursue an energy policy designed to free it from its dependence on supplies from the rest of the world, supporting investments in shale oil and shale gas, despite the considerable environmental impact of these resources. Indeed, whereas in 2011 imports of oil and gas still accounted for 49 per cent and 8 per cent of the USA’s domestic consumption respectively, by 2021 just 3 per cent of oil consumed was imported, and the USA had become a net exporter of natural gas.
As far as EU-Africa relations are concerned, the link between energy and security is illustrated not only by the fact that the launch of the European Green Deal will lead to a progressive reduction in purchases of fossil energy from abroad, but also by the main economic policy tool on which the Deal is based, namely the so-called carbon border adjustment mechanism. In the coming years, this measure will already be starting to influence relations between the EU and third countries.
In the present context, we confine ourselves to general considerations concerning EU-Africa relations in both the short and the medium-to-long term. In the short term, the Green Deal’s consequences will be felt following the entry into force, on 1 October, 2023, of the aforementioned “carbon border adjustment mechanism”,[3] a measure designed to create a level playing field by progressively ensuring that “the carbon price of imports is equivalent to the carbon price of domestic production and [therefore] that the EU’s climate objectives are not undermined.” Accordingly, goods imported into the EU from third countries will be subject to a tax on imported carbon, which will depend on the European carbon price determined by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme mechanism. Initially, this tax will concern a small number of industrial sectors (iron and steel, cement, fertilisers, aluminium and electricity production), and therefore its impact on African economies will be limited; its broader application, however, could seriously hamper their development.
This carbon tax, which is part of the new own resources package approved by the Council on 14 December 2020,[4] and will be applied internally from 2026, is among the own resources that will have to be introduced for another reason, too: to guarantee repayment of the debt issued by the European Union to finance the NextGenerationEU recovery programme. It is estimated that the revenue from this tax alone will range between 5 and 14 billion euros per year. The European Parliament, in its resolution of 10 March 2021, requested that part of the resources resulting from its application be used to fund investments promoting the energy transition of less developed countries. This is the context in which the European Commission decided to extend, from 2020, the EU-Africa partnership to the renewable energy sector. Full implementation of the series of initiatives that this entails would allow Africa to become the first continental economy in the world to achieve economic development without necessarily going through a transitionary phase involving the use of fossil energy sources.
In the medium-long term, Europe’s objective of moving towards a carbon-free economy by 2050 will lead to the disappearance from the world market of an annual demand for energy from fossil sources worth over 320 billion euros.[5] Much of the European share of this demand, specifically for natural gas and oil, is covered by African countries such as Algeria, Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya and Nigeria. Recently, moreover, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, imports from African and Middle Eastern countries have increased to compensate for the reduction in energy purchases from Russia.
Prior to the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, EU purchases of natural gas and oil accounted for between 75 and 90 per cent of all the EU-bound exports of African countries such as Libya, Nigeria and Algeria. From another perspective, in other words looking at the importance of the European market to these countries’ overall fossil energy exports, Europe is seen to account for a share of between 35 per cent (Nigeria) and 60 per cent (Algeria and Libya) of these countries’ global energy exports. As just pointed out, these latter percentages are destined to grow following the EU’s decision to stop purchasing energy from Russia. It goes without saying, therefore, that achieving the goal of a carbon-free European economy would eliminate a considerable share of these countries’ exports, worsening their economic and social situation.
This is why the EU, if it wants to avoid exacerbating these countries’ economic difficulties, and therefore triggering a further increase in the flow of economic migrants to Europe, must promote a Euro-African renewable energy production development plan. This plan is not only necessary to help these countries convert their energy production to renewable energy; it is also indispensable for the EU which, without it, will struggle to achieve energy self-sufficiency. Following the European Commission’s unveiling, in 2020, of its Hydrogen Strategy[6] plan, the EU began to promote numerous projects for the creation of a hydrogen economy. However, despite the plan’s premises, it quickly became apparent that the EU would not be able to achieve self-sufficiency in sustainable hydrogen production.[7]
Indeed, the subsequent initiative, named REPowerEU, envisaged that 10 million tonnes of renewable hydrogen would need to be imported, in other words 50 per cent of Europe’s total renewable hydrogen requirement of 20 million tonnes. The Commission’s forecasts indicate that imports of renewable hydrogen should come mainly from African and Middle Eastern countries,[8] with which, moreover, the first agreements have already been reached.
If we take into account a number of factors — the political instability of Africa as a whole, the spread of terrorist organisations operating within the continent, the frequent civil wars within many African countries and, above all, the established military presence of the USA, the growing military presence of Russia, and the growing economic influence of China —, the dual objective (nevertheless possible) of making Africa the first continent to achieve development without resorting to fossil energy sources, and of ensuring that the EU has the renewable energy it needs, is undoubtedly a highly ambitious one. For this reason, the EU as a whole will have to come up with convincing proposals, and ensure that it is credible on a political and military level. And this brings us to the second aspect of relations between the EU and Africa.
The turning point in these relations can only come when France finally manages to reckon with its colonial past in Africa, because the fact is that so far, in its dealings with Africa, it has never really shed its colonial mindset. The independence granted to the French colonies in Africa from the 1960s on was, to a large extent, purely formal.[9] The effects of this French policy actually date back to the entry into force of the 1947 Colonial Pact between France and its eleven African colonies, an agreement that, in spite of the decolonisation process, has managed to survive over the decades since. The Pact provided for the maintenance of France’s military presence in its former colonies and constituted the legal basis for military interventions in the African countries under French influence. De Gaulle maintained that the continuation of the measures provided for by the Pact was justified by the prospect of growing political integration between France and its former colonies, a scenario, never destined to endure, that he dubbed Françafrique. In fact, the succession of French presidents that followed him, from Mitterrand onwards, including Chirac, Holland and Macron, had to admit that Françafrique had become a meaningless political vision.[10] But the continued existence of a colonial-type relationship, in spite of various declarations to the contrary, has generated, in the African countries, feelings of mistrust and frustration towards France.
The Pact, in fact, also had economic implications, as it ensured preferential treatment for French companies. Furthermore, it gave rise to the establishment of two financially integrated areas that both use the CFA franc (where CFA stands for Communauté financière d’Afrique): the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA, whose eight member states are Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo), and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC, whose members are Cameroon, Chad, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo).
These two economic-financial communities, which are a partial reflection of the influence France exerts over African countries, are becoming increasingly crisis ridden. At a summit held last spring between France and the CEMAC member states, as France reiterated its commitment to ensuring the convertibility of the CFA franc, the African countries were instead calling for the progressive removal of France’s representatives in the CEMAC central bank and the repatriation of reserves held in the French central bank.[11]
The distancing from France has been even more dramatic within the UEMOA: Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have all experienced anti-French coups d’état, as indeed has Chad, which is a member of CEMAC. These coups d’état have thus involved four of the five countries that, back in 2014, set up the G5 Sahel, an institutional framework for the coordination and monitoring of regional cooperation in development and security policies in the region. These examples are a clear demonstration of the failure of French policy towards African countries, a context in which the only chance of rebuilding a constructive relationship probably rests with the EU, although France will first have to have ended all its colonial-type relationships. For its part, the EU, to be credible, will have to choose interlocutors recognised by African countries. These interlocutors should be, on the one hand, the African Union, which has recently been made a G20 permanent member, and on the other, regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), known in French as the Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique de l’ouest (CEDEAO), whose member states are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.[12] This organisation, through the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), also deals with security. Five ECOWAS member states have planned to adopt a common currency starting from 2025; the currency is expected to be called the Eco and the monetary union will be called the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ). With regard to the EU’s interlocutors, the fact that we identify both the African Union and regional organisations is explained by the fact that the first forms of unification will need to be reinforced at regional level in the initial phase, since the African Union is still a very weak organisation.
The other thing that the EU can do, in order to be a credible interlocutor, is equip itself with an autonomous military force, capable of intervening, at the request of the African Union and the UN, in crisis situations. There are already EU operations underway in Africa, the most important being the Atalanta mission in the Pacific and the mission in the Gulf of Guinea. The latter, established by a Council Decision in August 2023,[13] has both a civil and a military nature.
On the subject of an independent EU armed forces, we should not forget the establishment of a rapid deployment force — joint and multinational — envisaged by the Strategic Compass. This was approved in 2022, and October 2023 saw the first training mission ahead of its definitive establishment in 2025.
This is of course only a first step towards a European defence, which, to be credible, will have to reach at least the minimum size already envisaged during the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999, when it was decided to establish a 60,000-strong rapid intervention force. The reform of the EU Treaties, approved by the European Parliament during the session of 22 November 2023, and transmitted by the Council to the European Council for the convening of a European Convention, could open the way for a further step forward. If, however, the Convention fails to be convened or, if convened, if it fails to produce the desired results, then the states that are willing, within the framework of the Treaties, to support the establishment of an autonomous European military capability to be placed at the permanent disposal of the EU and the United Nations must at that point move in this direction.
[1] The war in the Caucasus, in particular, has highlighted Italy’s strong dependence on natural gas supplies from Azerbaijan. In fact, Italy opposed EU aid to Armenia, and the only European country that was able to help the latter militarily was France.
[2] The figures for the USA and China are based on data taken from: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2012 (https://www.laohamutuk.org/DVD/docs/BPWER2012report.pdf), and BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2022 (https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf).
[3] Cf. European Parliament, A WTO-compatible EU carbon border adjustment mechanism, resolution of 10 March 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0071_EN.pdf.
[4] Cf. Council Decision (UE, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/UE, Euratom, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020D2053. Furthermore, 16 December 2020 saw the approval of an interinstitutional agreement aimed at defining a timetable for the introduction of these new own resources (Interinstitutional agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020Q1222(01).
[5] M. Leonard, J. Pisani-Ferry, J. Shapiro, S. Tagliapietra and G. Wolff, The geopolitics of the European Green Deal, Bruegel, Policy Contribution Issue n. 04/21 | February 2021, https://www.bruegel.org/sites/default/files/wp_attachments/PC-04-GrenDeal-2021-1.pdf.
[6] Cf. European Commission, EU Hydrogen Strategy, https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-systems-integration/hydrogen_en#eu-hydrogen-strategy.
[7] Cf. L. Collins, “'Europe is never going to be capable of producing its own hydrogen in sufficient quantities”: EU climate chief, Rechargenews, 4 May 2022, https://www.rechargenews.com/energy-transition/europe-is-never-going-to-be-capable-of-producing-its-own-hydrogen-in-sufficient-quantities-eu-climate-chief/2-1-1212963.
[8] Cf. European Commission, REPowerEU: A plan to rapidly reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels and fast forward the green transition, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_3131.
[9] G.K. Busch, The U.S. and the wars in the Sahel, Academia, https://www.academia.edu/33189877/The_U_S_and_the_Wars_in_the_Sahel.
[10] La fin du pacte colonial ? La politique africaine de la France sous J. Chirac et après, Politique africaine, n. 105/2007, https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-africaine-2007-1-page-7.htm; O. Faye, Les adieux répétés des présidents à la « Françafrique », Le Monde, 10 March 2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/m-le-mag/article/2023/03/10/les-adieux-repetes-des-presidents-a-la-francafrique_6164976_4500055.html; Emmanuel Macron au Gabon : l’ère de la « Françafrique est révolue », déclare le président français, Le Monde, 2 March 2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2023/03/02/emmanuel-macron-a-commence-sa-tournee-africaine-sur-le-theme-de-la-protection-des-forets-au-gabon_6163848_3212.html.
[11] C. Cosset, Ressources financières et franc CFA : à Paris, une réunion ministérielle Cemac-France aux multiples enjeux, Radio France Internationale, https://amp.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20230425-ressources-financières-et-franc-cfa-à-paris-une-réunion-ministérielle-cemac-france-aux-multiples-enjeux.
[12] Between 2021 and 2023, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Niger were suspended from the Community following the coups in which they were involved.
[13] Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1599 of 3 August 2023 on a European Security and Defence Initiative in support of West African countries of the Gulf of Guinea, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32023D1599.
