Year LXVI, 2024, Single Issue
THE OUTCOME OF THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS: POSITIVES AND NEGATIVES*
As federalists our duty is always twofold, the first one being to contribute to the construction of the European political system. This is a task that extends beyond the institutional dimension to include the issue of citizen participation (even though the institutional dimension remains important, not only because of Europe’s position in today’s world, but also because we know perfectly well that certain constitutional engineering interventions can help to advance the European political system). The recent European elections, however, have brought no great improvement in citizen participation, which is up by just half a percentage point on 2019. This can only mean that Europe is experiencing a period of stagnation in terms of the level of participation, which is not good news. Obviously, to take the glass-half-full view, we can say that at least there has been no reversal of the trend, but the fact is that whereas 2019 brought an eight-point improvement, with voter turnout rising from 42 to 50 per cent, this year has seen it increasing to just 50.5 per cent. We must certainly reflect on this point and ask ourselves why this is. After all, we might legitimately have hoped for a more substantial improvement, given that the big issues of recent years, such as the pandemic and the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, are ones on which decisions are taken at European level, something that might have been expected to generate more interest in the European elections. But this has not been the case, with the situation actually proving similar to that of 2014 — the minimal improvement recorded that year was the first reversal of the downward trend that had characterised the European elections since their introduction. A substantial improvement followed in 2019, thanks to the mobilisation of young people around concerns over the environment and climate change.
Our second duty as federalists is to address the question of the character (pan-European or otherwise?) of electoral debate and campaigning in the run-up to European elections. As I have said before, while on the one hand the spotlight this year was turned on certain topics that clearly concern Europe and international relations, which is a good thing, on the other we have to recognise that there emerged many clearly national dynamics. In Spain, for example, issues closely connected with the prime minister’s wife and with our relations with Argentina featured very prominently in the election campaign. We therefore also need to carry out an analysis to establish whether, in the media and in the parties’ public interventions at least, this year has seen some improvement in terms of the European character of the debate.
In particular, we need to see whether the debates between the candidates for the Commission presidency (from which, in my view, the general public remains somewhat detached) were more watched than those of five and ten years ago. It would also be interesting to analyse whether, and to what extent, the national political parties highlighted their European affiliations (an aspect that, I suspect, has not seen much improvement).
The overall result of the elections, on the other hand, is very clear: there has been a rightward shift in the centre of gravity due to the improved performances of both the pro-European democratic right and the forces on the far right. So, more seats for the European People’s Party (EPP), for Identity and Democracy (ID), and for the ECR Group. Instead, the socialists’ numbers are down, albeit not by much. In fact, the socialists, which appear to have lost 2 or 3 seats, remain the second largest political group, holding out thanks to the results recorded by the Spanish socialists (30 per cent) and by the PD in Italy (24 per cent), whereas the SPD in Germany has performed very badly. In France, on the other hand, the socialists, after many years, have finally done better, securing 14 per cent of the vote. Clearly then, among the pro-European groups, it is the liberals, recording very negative results in France and Germany, and the greens, again in France and Germany, that have suffered the real body blows. Both are groups that have lost a lot of the strength they once had. So, there can be no denying that, in European politics, we seem to be witnessing a movement to the right of what we might call the strictly ideological axis. That said, it is also true that this is not an overall victory for the far right. Certainly, the far right have recorded some very good, even worryingly good, results in key countries, including founding member states like Germany, where they are second with 16 per cent, France, where they have topped the poll with 31 per cent, and Italy, where Meloni’s party has also emerged as the biggest, taking 29 per cent of the vote. These three results are certainly discouraging. However, the far right have not won everywhere. They have not won in Scandinavia, or (with the exception of Italy) in the Mediterranean. All in all, then, the pro-European majority is still there. However, it needs to be expanded to include the greens, because, as long as it comprises only the EPP, socialists and liberals, it remains a rather thin majority.
Looking at the arithmetic, though, it is actually the only majority possible. Because, even were we to combine the EPP, ID and ECR (a politically impossible scenario, regardless of the numbers), this would still only give us 316 seats, well short of the 360 needed for a majority. It would therefore also be necessary to bring the liberals on board, but they (perhaps with the exception of the Dutch ones who, have reached a deal with Wilder) would never agree to be part of such a majority. Furthermore, since the largest delegations within the EPP are the German and Polish ones, this would effectively mean an alliance between the Polish People’s Party and the ECR Group, whose strongest party is Kaczynski’s, an idea that simply does not hold up. And that is to say nothing of Germany’s CDU having to join an alliance with AfD and Le Pen. In short, such a combination would be impossible, both arithmetically and ideologically.
Europe therefore continues to rest on the above-described pro-European majority, which naturally has to be ideologically transversal. But the most important thing its members have in common is the fact that they are not just pro-European, but also in favour of institutional reform of Europe. In fact, all these parties, even the Party of the European Left, made Treaty reform part of their electoral manifesto. The same cannot be said of the conservatives and those that lie more to the far right, let’s say, whose idea of Europe is different altogether.
Moving on, the post-electoral process is very interesting. Both within and outside Europe, the level of media attention surrounding European elections and the process that unfolds in their wake has never been greater. The 1984 European elections certainly did not generate the level of interest that has been aroused by the more recent ones, which is understandable given that the European Parliament is now called upon to elect the President of the Commission, and has to find a coalition among the forces represented within it. In this regard, the pro-European political groups have a very important role to play, since they have the possibility to make the Commission president’s election conditional upon important demands, which will therefore have to be built into the new European Commission’s work programme.
We, as the European Parliament, have taken a stand on this aspect. One of the essential elements of the European political system under construction is the so-called Spitzenkandidaten process. As you know, we saw a backward step in this regard in 2019. Following the positive experience of 2014, when the European Council and European Parliament respectively nominated and appointed Juncker as Commission president, since he was the Spitzenkandidat of the party that had obtained the most seats in the elections (the EPP), this mechanism was not applied in 2019. First, because no agreement was reached in the European Parliament on a common candidate, and second because there were different dynamics at play within the European Council, given that Angela Merkel was at odds with her party on the choice of candidate.
Now, however, we have the opportunity to get back on track. Indeed, no one today is questioning the fact that the outgoing president, who is also the candidate nominated by the European People’s Party, should be the one given the task of seeking a majority in the European Parliament. Incidentally, I am here deliberately using a language typical of national parliamentary democracies because the European Council can be likened to a collective head of state. Being nominated by the European Council does not guarantee election, though, and von der Leyen will therefore have to set up a negotiating table with the various pro-European political groups and reach a coalition agreement, as also happens in national settings. And it is on the basis of a common programme, which is likely to be signed by the EPP, socialists, liberals and greens, that she will have to appeal for support in the vote to be held in the July 2024 plenary of the European Parliament.
Such an unfolding of events will constitute a major step forward in the progressive construction of a true European political system, and this is very important. For us federalists, now is also the time to step up our efforts to exert political influence on the various political parties. We must in fact ensure that this coalition agreement contains not only conditions relating to policy areas such as climate change and work, but also conditions of an institutional nature. It is, in particular, necessary to secure the new Commission’s support for the European Parliament’s Treaty reform proposals, also because Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union provides that once the reform project is placed on the agenda of the European Council (something that is yet to happen), the European Commission’s opinion must be sought. It has to be said that, so far, the Commission has not supported us: a few months ago, it issued a Communication that, without even mentioning simplified revision procedures, went in entirely the wrong direction, making various references to ‘continuous progress’ and even to the use of enhanced cooperation and the existing so-called passerelle clauses.
An alliance between the European Parliament and the Commission, underpinned by a decision by the parliament to make its vote conditional upon the Commission’s support for its proposal, is both a great opportunity and a necessary move, because the battle within the European Council continues to be very difficult, making it necessary to force the latter into in a corner. In fact, in the wake of these latest elections, the road ahead has become narrower, not easier.
First of all, it needs to be seen with how much conviction the new parliament will continue to reiterate the position taken by the European Parliament in November 2023. The pro-European majority is there and the pro-European political parties have listened to us (it is actually the first time that as many as five political groups have done so). But we have a problem with the EPP, which is a pro-European group but has a majority that does not support the federalist line of thinking.
We are obviously fortunate that the largest delegation within it is that of Germany’s CDU. And that Forza Italia has a clearly pro-federalist line, as does, generally speaking, the Spanish People’s Party. However, the same cannot be said of the Poles belonging to the other large EPP delegation, the one led by Tusk. There is work to be done there, and we hope that support among EPP members can be increased when the Spinelli Group is renewed, maybe even by convincing them to lead it. Because we now need the parliament (which has already done its job and must not have to do it again) to reiterate with conviction its position on Treaty reform.
From our perspective, the composition of the European Council, meanwhile, has not improved. It is true that a simple majority is enough to convene a Convention, but what is going happen in France in 15 days’ time? Will we still have a pro-European government there? Let us hope so, but I really don’t know. My socialist colleagues have formed an alliance with France Insoumise based on a common programme that respects, we might say, the pro-European agenda. But who will be France’s new prime minister? Who will be its foreign affairs minister? There would also be uncertainties in the event of a victory for the new Popular Front. Meanwhile, the other large pro-European government (Germany’s) has recently found itself greatly weakened, and there will be elections in Germany next year. In Spain, Pedro Sánchez has not fared badly, taking 30 per cent, but the internal situation there is very difficult. Failure by the Spanish government to pass next year’s budget — this is something that could happen, given the situation in Catalonia — would move us closer to the possibility, probability even, of general elections in Spain in 2025. And what stance would a Spanish People’s Party-led government supported by Vox’s far right take on the issue of Treaty reform? All these considerations lead us to conclude that there is a window of opportunity, but only a narrow one. In short, the Treaty revision procedure needs to be triggered as soon as possible because the situation in terms of the composition of the European Council could, before long, become even less favourable.
This is why, in our advocacy work, we must target mainly the Commission, but also the European Council president, who thus far has been a great disappointment. Every time Charles Michel is publicly asked to express his opinion on Treaty reform, he says it will never happen; what is more, in the six months since it was forwarded by the Spanish government, the European Parliament’s request has never been taken into account in European Council conclusions — an attitude that amounts to institutional uncooperativeness and a failure to respect correct procedure. So, we need to try and get the European Parliament and the Spinelli Group to urge the new President of the European Council, who will certainly be a socialist, to at least consider the Parliament’s proposal, and look at when the procedure might be started.
We can certainly talk about alternative ways forward, without precluding anything. But there can be no doubt that a constituent mandate for the European Parliament would be a more difficult route, in the current situation, than kickstarting the process of Treaty reform with a Convention.
Domènec Ruiz Devesa
[*] Text of a talk given by the president of the Union of European Federalists (UEF), Domènec Ruiz Devesa, at the meeting of the Federal Committee of the European Federalist Movement (MFE) held in Rome on June 22, 2024.
