Year LXIV, 2022, Single Issue, Page 122
In memory of Karl Lamers, who died this year, The Federalist hereby republishes the document presented to the Bundestag on 1 September 1994 by W. Schäuble and K. Lamers on behalf of the CDU/CSU Group on the creation of a federal core within the European Union. The document remains a fundamental and essential contribution to the debate on differentiated integration and a two-speed Europe.
REFLECTIONS ON EUROPEAN POLITICS
I. The Situation
The development of the process of European unification has entered a critical phase. Unless a solution can be found, within the next two-four years, to the causes of the current disturbing evolution, the Union, instead of moving towards the greater convergence envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty, risks turning inexorably into a weaker organisation, essentially limited to certain economic aspects and made up of various sub-groups. This kind of “improved” free trade area would not allow European society to overcome the existential problems and external challenges it faces.
The current critical phase has several main causes:
— the strain placed on institutions that were created for six states, but are expected to function with 12 and soon (presumably) 16 members;
— the growing divergence between interests based on different degrees of socio-economic development, capable of concealing the fundamental commonality of interests;
— the different perceptions within the European Union (stretching from the North Cape to Gibraltar) of the EU’s internal and above all external priorities (e.g., Maghreb, Eastern Europe);
— the profound economic-structural change, characterised by massive unemployment, impossible to overcome in the short term, that is threatening already sorely tested social systems and the very stability of society. This crisis is just one aspect of the general crisis of Western civilisation;
— a strengthening of “regressive” nationalism in (almost) all the member states, due to internal problems linked to the development of modern societies and to external threats such as migration. Grave fears lead people to seek solutions, or refuge at least, in the nation-state and a return to nationalism;
— the excessive intervention, but evident weakness, of some governments and national parliaments in the face of the problems mentioned;
— the open question — open at least as regards the date and modalities — of the integration into the European Union of the states of Central (and Eastern) Europe, a challenge to the current member states that will clarify not only the contribution they wish to and can make, but also how they define themselves, morally and spiritually. The Union’s response will confirm or otherwise its ability and determination to become the backbone of the continental order, alongside a democratic Russia enjoying renewed stability while still maintaining its alliance with the United States.
II. Germany’s Interests
Given Germany’s geographical position, size and history, it is very much in the country’s interests to ensure that Europe is not subjected to the effects of centrifugal forces that could see Germany once again caught in a difficult intermediate position.
Now that the East-West conflict is over, a stable order must also be found for the eastern part of the continent, a quest that is particularly important for Germany: after all, given its situation, Germany would be the first to suffer the direct effects of any instability in the countries of Eastern Europe. The only way to prevent a return to the unstable pre-war system that saw Germany relegated to its old awkward position between East and West is to integrate the neighbouring Central and Eastern European countries into the post-war (Western) European system, while at the same time maintaining a broad understanding with Russia. It is absolutely essential to prevent a vacuum, capable of undermining the continent’s stability, from forming once again at the heart of Europe. Should (Western) European integration fail to evolve in this direction, Germany might, as a result of the need for security, be induced or forced to define stability in Eastern Europe on its own terms, and through recourse to traditional means. Such an undertaking would far exceed Germany’s strength and would lead to a crumbling of cohesion within the European Union, not least as an effect of the ubiquitous memories of when German policy towards the East essentially amounted to cooperation with Russia, to the detriment of the states located between these two countries. Consequently, enlargement of the Union to the East is fundamentally in Germany’s interests, as indeed is a deepening of integration, since this is the very prerequisite for enlargement. Without internal consolidation, the Union would be unable to cope with the immense tasks stemming from its eastwards expansion and run the risk of collapsing and regressing to the status of a weak group of states, unable to meet Germany’s need for stability. In essence, this German interest in stabilisation coincides with that of Europe as a whole.
Due to its position, size and close relations with France, Germany bears particular responsibility for ensuring the integration of Eastern Europe and also has the opportunity to play a decisive role in promoting a development that will benefit both Germany and Europe.
Germany’s accession to the presidency of the Union on 1 July 1994 marks the start of the immense long-term efforts necessary for this country to achieve this objective.
III. What to Do? Proposals
The above objective can only be achieved through a combination of different measures, both in the institutional sphere and in different political fields. Five interdependent measures are proposed below, which together form a unitary whole:
— institutional development of the Union and implementation of the principle of subsidiarity, which also includes a new transfer of competences to lower levels;
— strengthening of the EU’s hard core;
— qualitative improvement of Franco-German relations;
— strengthening of the Union’s capacity for action in the field of foreign and security policy;
— enlargement of the EU to the East.
Obviously, the fight against organised crime, the creation of a common migration policy, the fight against unemployment, a common social policy, Europe’s competitiveness and environmental protection are all crucially important issues, especially from the perspective of European citizens’ perception of the Union.
1. Institutional Development.
The institutional development of the EU that will emerge from the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference must be based on the principles below:
— the aim must be to strengthen the EU’s capacity for action and its democratic and federal basis;
— to this end, an answer must be found to the constitutional question of who should do what. This answer must be the subject of a quasi-constitutional document which clearly establishes the competences of the European Union, and of its member states and regions, defining the fundamental ideas on which the Union is based;
— this document must be inspired by the model of the federal state and the principle of subsidiarity, as regards not only the delimitation of competences, but also the problem of knowing whether certain tasks should be undertaken by the public authorities, including the Union, or whether, on the other hand, they should fall to associations. Germany, which requested that the principle of subsidiarity be introduced into the Maastricht Treaty and has some experience in this regard, is called upon to make concrete proposals regarding not only the application of the principle of subsidiarity to future EU measures, but also the adaptation of current regulations to this principle;
— all the current institutions, the Council, Commission, presidency and European Parliament, need to be reformed. Numerous proposals have already been advanced in this regard, including that of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group. The reforms must be geared towards a new concept of institutional balance, which progressively gives the Parliament the status of a legislative body, with rights on a par with the Council. The latter is called upon to assume, in addition to other tasks of an essentially intergovernmental nature, the role of second chamber, i.e., Chamber of the States, while the Commission will act as the European government.
Democratisation of the EU, in addition to making the Union more effective, must constitute its central principle, applicable also and above all to the European Parliament, which, moreover, should be urged as from now to work closely and with full confidence on the preparation of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. At the same time, yet without this becoming a priority, importance should be attached to the role of the national parliaments in the formation of political will in Europe. In the case of the Council, the term democratisation should be taken to mean pursuit of a better balance between, on the one hand, the principle of equality of all member states, and, on the other, the distribution of votes in relation to each state’s number of inhabitants.
The future development of the EU institutions must combine coherence and consistency, elasticity and flexibility.
The Union’s institutions must be developed in such a way that they have the elasticity necessary to compensate for the tensions that are inevitable in a Community extending from the North Cape to Gibraltar, and can achieve a degree of differentiation that adequately caters for differences in the states’ ability (and desire) to integrate. On the other hand, they must be stable enough to allow a strengthening of the Union’s capacity for action in the face of particularly important challenges.
Despite the considerable legal and practical difficulties, the “variable geometry” or “multi-speed” Europe idea should be taken up and, as far as possible, institutionalised in the Treaty on European Union or in the aforementioned quasi-constitutional document. Otherwise, the Union will confine itself to mere intergovernmental cooperation favouring a “Europe à la carte”. In this context there also arises the need to know whether, in the event of an amendment of the Maastricht Treaty, the principle of unanimity referred to in article N should be replaced by a quorum to be specified. It is crucial that no country be able to oppose its veto, thereby blocking the efforts of other countries that are more equipped and more determined to increase their cooperation and integration.
The development of a flexible approach to integration, envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty for monetary union and already implemented outside the Treaty in the context of the Schengen Agreement, appears all the more necessary in view of the fact that the aforementioned institutional development difficulties, already immense in the current situation, are not destined to decrease in the future, as the negotiations on enlargement of the Union to the EFTA states have indicated. Avoiding stagnation and therefore regression of the integration process would already be an excellent result.
2. Strengthening the EU’s Hard Core.
In addition to the need to improve the effectiveness of decision making within the European Union and democratise the formation of political will, there is also a need to further strengthen the EU’s existing hard core, made up of countries committed to integration and ready to cooperate. At present, this hard core comprises five or six countries, but it must not be closed; on the contrary, it must be open to member countries willing and able to meet its requirements.
The task of the hard core is to oppose, through an established centre, the centrifugal forces generated by constant enlargement, in order to prevent divergent development between a South-West group, more prone to protectionism and led in a sense by France, and a North-East group that supports global free trade and is directed in a sense by Germany.
To this end, the countries of the hard core must not only participate in all areas of politics, but must also jointly and more resolutely orient their action in a community direction and launch more common initiatives aimed at promoting the development of the Union. As a result, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands need to consolidate their association with Franco-German cooperation, especially as the Netherlands has now grown less sceptical of these two countries’ role as a driving force of European integration. Cooperation between hard-core countries must focus in particular on the areas added to the Treaties of Rome by the Maastricht Treaty.
In the monetary sphere, too, it is possible to observe the emergence of a hard core, made up of these five countries, which, together with Denmark and Ireland, are the ones closest to meeting the convergence criteria established by the Maastricht Treaty. This is a particularly important aspect as monetary union constitutes the hard core of political union (and is not merely an extra element of integration, as it is widely believed to be in Germany). If monetary union is to be implemented as scheduled, it will initially apply only to a small group of countries – in accordance with the alternative envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty. Therefore, in this case, too, it will only be realised if the five-member hard core devotes itself systematically and with determination to this objective. To this end, they should establish greater coordination in the fields of:
— monetary policy,
— fiscal and budgetary policy, and
— economic and social policy,
with the aim of creating a common policy and consequently — independently of the formal decisions of 1997 and 1999 — laying the foundations, in this time frame, of a monetary union within the group.
The hard-core group in Europe must convince all EU members – particularly Italy, a founding member, as well as Spain and the UK of course – of its willingness to integrate them as soon as they have solved some of their current problems, and to the extent that they themselves intend to meet the aforementioned requirements. The formation of a hard core is not a goal in itself, but rather a means of reconciling contradictory objectives: deepening and enlargement of the European Union.
3. A New Quality Phase in Franco-German Relations.
If the historic process of European unification is to achieve its political objective and not settle for marking time, Franco-German relations need to enter a new quality phase. For this reason, no significant action should be taken in the fields of foreign and European policy without prior Franco-German consultation. With the East-West conflict now behind us, the importance of Franco-German cooperation, far from diminishing, is now even greater than in the past.
France and Germany form the centre of the hard core. From the very outset, these two countries have been the engine of the European unification process. However, their special relationship is now being put to the test: in fact, it is even showing signs of the aforementioned divergence of interests and perceptions and, therefore, of the risk of divergent development. In France it is feared that the process of enlargement to the North, especially the accession of Austria, and, subsequently, that of enlargement to the East could result in a weak group of states in which Germany would see its power considerably strengthened, and therefore come to assume a central position. For France, therefore, it is vitally important to deepen the Union, even before enlarging it. Now, faced with a unified Germany and — even more important in this context — a Germany that is once again in a position to pursue an active policy in the East and enjoy the same freedom of action as its Western interlocutors, the old question posed at the start of the process of European unification (initially confined to Western Europe), namely how to integrate a strong Germany into the European structures, returns under a new guise that actually shows its real significance.
Especially with regard to Franco-German relations, it is important that this question be posed clearly, in order to avoid misunderstandings and mistrust.
In addition, an equally important consideration from Germany’s perspective is the fact that the willingness of its neighbours to the East (as well as that of the EFTA states) to join the EU is driven, in no small measure, by their desire to free themselves from excessive dependence on Germany, a desire which can only be realised in the framework of a Community that is more than just a free trade area.
Crucially, of course, Germany must demonstrate through its political action that it adheres strenuously to the objective of a strong, integrated Europe, capable of acting. (Germany believes that it has long since demonstrated this, but, as shown by the criticisms of its behaviour at the time of the accession of the Scandinavian countries and Austria, not everyone shares this belief.) Germany must provide proof, through proposals to develop the Union institutionally and politically, before enlargement but also with a view to it.
If Germany must present its position clearly and unequivocally, then so, too, must France. France must correct the impression it has thus far given. Indeed, while its basic desire to pursue European integration is not in doubt, it is often indecisive when it comes to taking concrete measures to that end, due to persistence of the belief that the sovereignty of the nation-state, which has long been no more than an empty shell, simply cannot be renounced.
Given the importance of monetary union, especially for Franco-German relations, it is necessary — alongside the preparatory work for the hard core — to overcome the differences of opinion between France and Germany on essential economic and political issues, such as those relating to “industrial policy” and competition law. In this context, it would be highly desirable to reach an agreement on the creation of a Union cartel office. Furthermore, clarification of the long-term objectives of the CAP and of the key features of the future financial organisation of the Union is also required.
Similarly, it is necessary to overcome the differences that frequently arise between France and Germany on the central problem of European defence and its relationship with NATO (as we are seeing in the context of the discussion on how to implement the decision on Combined Joint Task Forces, taken at the NATO summit in January 1994).
Since these are two crucial problems, the corresponding Franco-German councils (Economic and Social Council and Defence Council) should seek to be a forum, objective and free from any defined doctrine, for the discussion of principles.
More than ever, Germany’s relationship with France constitutes an indicator of the depth of its belonging to the political culture of the West, a reality that contrasts with the trend (now regaining ground above all in intellectual circles) that promotes a Sonderweg, or specific German path. This is all the truer now that the USA, with the East-West conflict a thing of the past, can no longer play its traditional role. A serious and open dialogue on the concepts that favour these different tendencies, and on mutual feelings and resentments in Franco-German relations, is just as necessary as a strengthening of political cooperation between the two countries.
4. Making the Union Capable of Acting in the Field of Foreign and Security Policy.
It is crucially important, for the future, to considerably increase the Union’s capacity for action in the field of foreign and security policy.
Europe’s nation-states are no longer able to guarantee their own security by themselves, and this is especially true following the resurgence in Europe of security problems we had considered long resolved, a situation linked to the fact that the United States, with the East-West confrontation now over, is not willing to guarantee assistance with all types of conflicts. The ability to guarantee one’s own security, to defend oneself, constitutes the condition and very essence of the sovereignty of states.
This applies equally to the European Union as a community of states, given that these can guarantee their sovereignty only within the community. Since awareness of their own sovereignty is the determining factor in the relationships that peoples establish internally and with each other, the common defence capacity of this European community of states constitutes an inalienable factor in the stabilisation of a proper EU identity, one that nevertheless leaves each member state room to safeguard its identity.
In the few years that have passed since the end of the East-West conflict, the definition of a common foreign and security policy for the Union has proved to be much more important and urgent than was envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty. Even the largest member countries are unable to meet external challenges. All polls show that the vast majority of citizens want a common foreign and security policy. However, their support for the European integration process has sharply weakened due to the Union’s insufficient reaction to the dramatic developments in the eastern part of the continent. The question of the status of future members in matters of security policy is decisive for Europe’s political character and general political organisation.
The action of the European Union in the field of foreign and security policy must be based on a strategic principle which defines the common interests and objectives with the utmost clarity, setting out the conditions and procedures, in addition to the political, economic and financial instruments. The priority fields of the common foreign and security policy are the following:
— common policy aimed at stabilising Central and Eastern Europe;
— development of relations with Russia aimed at establishing a broad understanding;
— common policy in the Mediterranean area, whose stability is of fundamental interest not only to the countries bordering the Mediterranean, but also to Germany;
— development of a strategic understanding with Turkey;
— a new approach in transatlantic relations.
The transatlantic relationship is of particular importance, given that it covers all the issues related to the common foreign and security policy and therefore requires a common policy shared by the European Union and the United States. There is also a need for concerted transatlantic action in the face of future global challenges.
The development of a common European defence is clearly more urgent than was envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty, which postponed it to some indefinite time; the fact is, now is the right time. The internal difficulties between European countries, in addition to the difficulties that emerged between Europe and the United States during the war in the former Yugoslavia, highlight all the urgency of this claim. Efforts to achieve the common European defence must be doubled, given that the Europeans are called upon to shoulder much greater responsibility for their own security, both as regards measures to maintain or establish peace and, even more, as regards the status of future members of the Union in matters of security. In a community of states conceived as a union, all members must enjoy the same external security status. This is a prerequisite for membership. If the United States is expected not only to continue to honour its obligations on the current terrain of the Alliance, but also to extend them (at least) to the countries joining the Union, then it follows that Europe should make the greater contribution in the non-nuclear field.
From a longer-term perspective, NATO must therefore be transformed into an alliance in which the United States and Canada, on the one hand, and a Europe capable of action, on the other, have equal weight. It is in this sense that the 1996 review conference must re-examine the WEU-EU relations, in accordance with Article J.4, paragraph 6.
With regard to the current problem of restructuring relations between the WEU and NATO with regard to tasks not included in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (Combined Joint Task Force), a solution must be found which authorises the Europeans, on the basis of an ad hoc decision of the NATO Council (taken therefore with the participation of the USA), to undertake independent actions, while nevertheless benefiting from NATO means and members of its military staffs. As President Clinton’s recent speech in Paris showed once again, the US is in favour of, and indeed demands, a European identity in defence matters.
To be active and fruitful, the common foreign and security policy needs to be supported by a more agile and effective institutional body and by coordination. To this end, it will be necessary, above all, to set up a highly qualified CFSP planning unit entrusted exclusively with prospective action, which can enter into direct contact with the national decision-making bodies.
NOTE — The proposals aimed at creating a European core and at further intensifying Franco-German cooperation do not amount to abandoning the hope of seeing Great Britain assume its role “at the heart of Europe”, complementing this core. On the contrary, they are based on the certainty that resolute development of Europe is the best means of favourably influencing the clarification of Great Britain’s position vis-à-vis Europe and its willingness to participate in further progress on the road to integration.
5. Enlargement to the East.
The accession of Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary (and Slovenia) to the EU is expected to take place in around 2000 and it is linked to the four measures previously proposed: it depends on the implementation of these, and is also their ultimate goal.
Due to their very nature, both the mere certainty of being accepted as an EU member state, and, even more so, the accession itself, are able to promote the political and economic development of these countries better than external aid can. Aside from this obvious political-psychological advantage, the economic commitments (both for new and old members) entailed in meeting this deadline are such that the objective can be achieved only by combining various measures. It is a question not just of bringing the legislation of the acceding states closer together, as already envisaged by the European Treaties, but also of carrying out reforms in various political areas of the Union, especially agriculture. It will also be necessary to provide for very long transition periods for economic adjustment, probably different from country to country and based on the concept of “variable geometry”. Ultimately, neither side must incur costs higher than those that would result from a later accession, especially as, in general, the later the accession, the higher the overall costs.
The admission of these countries should take place in stages and through closer cooperation. Here are the suggestions in this regard:
— systematic implementation of the opening of the market established by the European Treaties,
— harmonisation of trade policies,
— promotion of free trade and cooperation between reforming countries,
— broader participation of the Central and Eastern European states in some aspects of the CFSP, for example, more multilateral cooperation,
— transposition of cooperation in the field of security policy, as agreed in the Kirchberg Declaration on the “associated partnership” with the WEU,
— participation in cooperation on domestic policy and legal provisions relating to foreign nationals policy, migration, asylum law, visas and EUROPOL.
The Central and Eastern European states’ participation in the European Union must be accompanied by a policy of comprehensive partnership between the Union and Russia. Russia must acquire the certainty — to the extent that this is possible from the outside — that it constitutes the second political pillar of the continent, alongside the European Union. The partnership agreement and cooperation with Russia are an important first step in this direction, and must be followed by other agreements in the field of security policy, in relation to the accession of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to the EU /WEU and NATO.
Implementation of the programme proposed in the previous pages is the best way to overcome the citizens’ uncertainties about the unification process. Contrary to the unrealistic and dangerous declarations, both on the level of legal theory and on the political level, indulged in by certain intellectuals, and sometimes even by certain glib and ill-informed politicians, the great majority of citizens are perfectly aware of the need for a United Europe. However, the citizens rightly demand more democracy, greater publicity and transparency, and above all they want Europe to be successful in the fields mentioned above. After all, the citizens know very well that the interests of Germany can only be realised within Europe’s framework and space, and through Europe. In this way, the nation not only avoids exposing itself to damage, it also guarantees its own foundations, at the very moment in which it guarantees its future.
Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers
