Year LXII, 2020, Single Issue, Page 96

 

 

EUROPE AND THE LANGUAGE OF POWER

 

 

A surprisingly large number of people believe that the signing of the Treaties of Rome, on 25 March 1957, was the “founding act” of the European project, rather than the 1951 Schumann declaration, or the Paris Treaty of that same year. Actually, this is quite understandable, for two reasons in particular. The first is that the de jure birth of the European Union — i.e., of the institutions constituting one of the most advanced expressions of European integration — in Maastricht in 1992, and all the intermediate stages leading up to that point, derived essentially from the EEC (in fact, the Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties amended and extended the Treaties of Rome). The second is that although the process of European integration started with the Schumann declaration, the significance of the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was severely undermined by the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) project, which had been meant to pave the way for political union. As a result of the French National Assembly’s rejection of the EDC project, the governments of the Six (Italy, France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) decided that it would be better to shelve, for a while at least, the objective of political integration, and to focus instead on the objectives of development and economic integration. In this sense, the first ten years of the EEC were, without doubt, a resounding success, given that the progressive merging of the member states’ markets, coinciding with the period of international economic stability and post-war reconstruction ushered in by the Marshall Plan, and unfolding under America’s protective wing, opened up, for continental Europe, completely unprecedented development opportunities.

Today, especially now that the goal of creating a strong European common market regulated directly by EU institutions has substantially been reached, the time has come to rediscover the drive, stemming from shared ideals, that helped Europe to take its first steps on the road to integration. Indeed, the novelty and the revolutionary character of Monnet’s memorandum lay not in the ECSC, whose creation it outlined, but rather in the significance that this new institution would assume going forward. On re-reading Monnet’s memorandum, and the subsequent declaration by the French foreign minister Schumann, there can be no mistaking the idea that lay behind the creation of the ECSC. It was envisaged that this step would mark the start of the global affirmation of a united Europe — a Europe that could act as a third pole vis-à-vis the two superpowers, while also promoting a culture of peace. The creation of the ECSC was also a means of reinforcing the Europeans’ awareness, gained in the wake of WWII, of their common destiny, and of conveying this awareness to the rest of the world. “The cold war, whose essential objective is to make the opponent give way, is the first phase of real war” Monnet remarked, before concluding “In effect, we are at war already”.[1] Today, in the face of stark evidence that the shattering of the Cold War power logic (the mechanism of two opposing blocs) has left the world in a state of perennial instability, it has become necessary to give “the peoples in the ‘free’ countries hope in the more distant aims which will be assigned to them, (…) [in such a way as to create in them] an active determination to pursue those aims.”[2]

From this perspective, it is crucial to draw lessons from the failure of the EDC project in order to strengthen our ambitions as Europeans.

These issues have been addressed by Josep Borrell, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who, in a recent article, called upon Europe to “relearn the language of power”.[3] He began by underlining the need to recognise that it is still power politics that determines global balances. Indeed, the ruthless and crude use of this instrument (in particular by Trump’s USA, Russia and China) is perhaps the ugliest evidence we have that this continues to be the case. Power politics, being based on the balance of power, allows states that, for various reasons, have assumed global importance to exploit their position, using it, like a weapon, to force their geostrategic interests onto the rest of the world. Other countries, being too small or underdeveloped, do not even have the cards necessary to participate in this “great game”, and must therefore submit to the moves made by the big players. The result of this ruthless logic, whereby relations between states are governed not by war, so much as by the threat of it, is international anarchy. The solutions found to international disputes are often shaped by how and how effectively one state could potentially assert its prerogatives and apply its weight. In short, therefore, international relations can essentially be reduced to the need to weigh up the possible consequences of a hypothetical war among the countries concerned. And this brings us back to Monnet’s consideration, namely that war is always at the centre of political and strategic thought. So, having established the primacy of the power principle, let us return to Borrell’s article, this time to ask ourselves the fundamental, but rather tricky, question of the role the EU should play in the world. As Borrell points out, “It may, at first, seem difficult to face this challenge. After all, the EU was established to abolish power politics.”[4] Certainly, we appear to be faced with a striking paradox: on the one hand, we have an institution, born from the ruins of a war caused by German expansionism, that has always promoted the cause of multilateralism; on the other, “a harsher reality, with many actors ready to use force to get their way”.[5] But this is, indeed, the reality, and it has to be recognised as such. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that any EU role or intervention outside the current power situation is inconceivable. Naturally, it is important not to make the mistake of treating this affirmation as an absolute rule, and thus of elevating it to the status of an eternal paradigm. First, because this would play into the idea that the world is shaped purely by the clash of opposing and irreconcilable interests of states, and therefore has room only for strength and muscular confrontations. And second, and above all, because this interpretation offers absolutely no scope for change: indeed, viewed from this perspective, politics can do nothing more than support a power situation (no longer able to meet the challenges of our times) in which power politics is all that really counts.

The abovementioned paradox can, however, be overcome if we separate the two sides of the question: on the one hand, we have a harsh global situation, and on the other, a Europe that is not equipped to act in this setting. Therefore, to ensure true affirmation of its founding values, which are already partially realised within national communities around the world — indeed, the affirmation of these values must be neither partial nor confined to certain geographical areas —, the EU must, as the High Representative puts it, “relearn the language of power”. Unfortunately, this is precisely where the greatest difficulties are encountered, and they stem from the EU’s cumbersome institutional structure, but also from the fact that, crucially, political decisions depend on EU institutions, and since these operate according to the principle of intergovernmental cooperation, they generally have to be supported by the national governments unanimously. Borrell, too, highlights this now emblematic situation: “With unanimity rules, it is difficult to reach agreements on divisive issues, and the risk of paralysis is always present.”[6] It is important, however, to view the question from the correct perspective, recognising that the unanimity requirement, which effectively hands the states a sort of “power of veto”, is merely a symptom of the current power situation within the EU, inextricably linked to the issues of sovereignty and where power ultimately resides. Indeed, unless we remember that this power, and sovereignty in general, are still the exclusive prerogatives of the member states, and entirely under their control, then the states’ failure to understand that “using their vetoes weakens not just the Union, but also themselves”[7] will continue to seem amazing.

Two circumstances, in particular, help to clarify all this. First, unanimity voting has often been extended, almost routinely in fact, to areas in which the Treaties make no express provision for it, instead envisaging qualified voting. And yet even if, in these areas, majority voting were applied instead, it is likely that states that voted against the law or legislative act in the European Council would fail to apply it; after all, implementation has always been left to the discretion of the states. It would, in fact, be absurd to expect a government to sacrifice its sovereignty by implementing something it had opposed in the Council. There can therefore be no underestimating the political significance of the fact that, ultimately, unanimous agreements have always been reached in the Council, even at the cost of watering down political solutions, and without ever having to force a state’s hand: ultimately, the states have preferred to avoid opening up serious rifts that would expose the limits linked to the lack of European sovereignty and of a true European government capable of enforcing the decisions taken within the constraints of the Treaties.

The second circumstance is that the European Council, as the forum of the heads of state or government of the EU member states, has in a certain sense arrogated the right to decide even on matters that, strictly speaking, are not within its competence. This situation can be interpreted in two ways: first, as a sort of new version of the concert of nations that shaped power balances in Europe at the start of the nineteenth century, and second as evidence of the states’ growing awareness of the limits, in the absence of European-level management of the most important issues, of the myopic formula of opposing national sovereignties.

However, despite this growing awareness, unless the power situation in Europe can be redrawn, European-level management is destined to remain exclusively the prerogative of the states and, therefore, often inefficient.

Close analysis of the situation in the euro zone provides an even clearer, and more emblematic, illustration of this problem. In this setting, a federal institution, the European Central Bank, is responsible for monetary policy, while fiscal and budgetary policy remain exclusively, and very firmly, in the hands of the national parliaments and governments. The introduction of the single currency, given the inevitably close links necessary between the countries signing up for it, nevertheless created the need for some kind of coordination in the field of fiscal policy. This took the form of an informal assembly of the euro area finance ministers (the Eurogroup). This situation, whereby the Europgroup does not formally make decisions — these are still taken autonomously by the states —, serves as a kind of compass, and it shows us that there has, in fact, been been no change of direction at all: despite the existence of the single currency, the management of power in Europe continues to depend on the relations between states and, therefore, on the balance of power.

In Europe, there is one leader, in particular, who seems ready to take up the points raised by Borrell and willing to work to translate them into concrete solutions designed to effectively stabilise Europe’s position in the world. The leader in question is the French president Emmanuel Macron, who presented his vision in a speech given at the École de Guerre on 7 February, 2020, on occasion of the 60th anniversary of the creation of the French nuclear force (known as the Force de frappe).[8] Macron’s political action in Europe has always been based on critical reflection on the issue of sovereignty, in particular on the crisis of national sovereignty, and the need to rebuild sovereignty at European level. A significant part of his speech was given over to an analysis of the current situation in the world, which, as he sees it, is characterised by three “paradigm shifts”: the first, strategic, as shown by the abovementioned re-awakening of power politics, the second a “political and legal paradigm shift [in the form of] the multilateralism crisis and the regression of law in the face of power balances”,[9] and the third technological. And in the midst of these disruptive trends, which seem destined not to lessen but only escalate, all Europe has at its disposal are the few tools created (from Maastricht in 1992 to Lisbon in 2007) during the twenty years of American hegemony that Macron calls “the era of peace dividends”.[10] Indeed, although Europe’s decision (with the introduction of the single currency) to finally address the issue of national sovereignty, at least in relation to monetary policy, was undoubtedly a revolutionary step, and carried great symbolic value, in other fields, the European edifice still reflects the needs of a world scenario that no longer exists.

The most fundamental aspect of sovereignty is that it needs a government. Today, with the European states powerless in the face of global challenges, and ultimately unable to make their voices heard, even through the method of European coordination, a true European government, and therefore European sovereignty, is the only means of addressing the global issues. Only in this way, i.e., by setting up a new European sovereignty alongside the now powerless national version, can Europe become truly effective. According to Macron, the building (rebuilding) of these two levels of sovereignty must go hand in hand; however, since the creation of a European institution to which to transfer powers and competences in defence matters does not yet seem feasible (“For years to come when it comes to defence, Europe will only draw strength from national armed forces”),[11] it will be up to the single countries to fill the gap created by the growing lack of investments in the military field over recent years, and so contribute to the development of a “a shared strategic culture”, but he warns that “this [budgetary] effort means nothing if it is not implementing a strategic vision”.[12]

In his speech, Macron also offered a possible response to the questions raised by Borrell, strongly reiterating the need for Europe to speak “the language of power”. In just one passage, illustrating this point, he remarked: “For too long, Europeans have thought that it was enough to lead by example and that if they disarmed, others would follow. This is not so! Disarmament cannot be an objective in itself: it should first improve international security conditions.” The French president’s proposals for shaping this European strategic vision — he spoke of “tangible ambitions that we want to establish for Europe's security and defence policy” — [13] move along two lines. The first involves a rethinking of Europe’s relations with its traditional ally, the USA: Macron argues that the centrality of NATO must not be questioned, but “our security (...) inevitably requires that Europeans have a greater capacity for autonomous action.”[14] The second concerns the issue of nuclear deterrence: the Force de frappe plays a key role in the defence not only of France but also of Europe; after all a serious threat to any European country would inevitably affect France and, vice versa, France’s “nuclear forces (…) strengthen the security of Europe through their very existence and they have, in this sense, a truly European dimension.”[15]

Macron’s central point, which is part of the need to create, at European level, “a real policy of sovereignty”[16] able to complement and reinforce national sovereignty, emerges in his formal airing, aimed at countries wishing to follow this path, of the possibility that French nuclear resources might be shared for the benefit of other countries: “I would like strategic dialogue to develop with our European partners, which are ready for it, on the role played by France’s nuclear deterrence in our collective security. (…) This strategic dialogue and these exchanges will naturally contribute to developing a true strategic culture among Europeans.”[17] This proposal is highly significant since it fits in with the idea that the countries of Europe must take the federal leap in order to achieve the transfer of sovereignty that would guarantee them a true European defence policy. This transfer of sovereignty is the only way in which these countries, which currently depend entirely on the American umbrella to protect them, might find a credible alternative approach to the issue of their defence. Paradoxical as it may seem, in order to spread European values in the world, it is necessary to strengthen the defence policies of the member states and create a defensive capacity at European level (potentially also based on nuclear deterrence). But, as Macron points out, the choice facing Europe should not be viewed in such simple terms: “I do not believe that the choice is between a moral absolute with no link to strategic realities, and a cynical return to a lawless power struggle.”[18] In actual fact, in a setting in which the actions of countries such as China and Russia and, in particular, the supremacy that China has achieved on the world stage, are pushing to the fore an alternative model to the European one, and moreover one that could well become predominant, the need for a European player, even only in order to defend the European model, is becoming increasingly pressing. In seeking to “a different international order, with effective global governance which can set up and enforce law”[19], Europeans have no choice but to reckon with the current power situation. When all is said and done, a European federal state will, in any case, have to act in a foreign policy dimension in which relations are shaped by the balance of power. And yet, the very founding of this state will be both a revolutionary act and a demonstration that international politics and power management can mean something different from brutal muscular opposition between states. It will therefore do much to promote this alternative approach.

Paolo Milanesi

---

[1] Jean Monnet, Memoirs, Introduction by George W. Ball, Translated from the French by Richard Mayne, New York, Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1978, p. 290, https://archive.org/details/MonnetJeanMemoirs/mode/2up.

[2] Discussion paper by Jean Monnet (3 May 1950), https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/discussion_paper_by_jean_monnet_3_may_1950-en-e8707ce5-dd60-437e-982a-0df9226e648d.html.

[3] J. Borrell, Embracing Europe’s Power, New Europe, February 14, 2020, https://www.neweurope.eu/article/embracing-europes-power.

[4] Ibidem.

[5] Ibidem.

[6] Ibidem.

[7] Ibidem.

[8] Speech of the President of the Republic on the Defense and Deterrence Strategy, 7 February, 2020, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/02/07/speech-of-the-president-of-the-republic-on-the-defense-and-deterrence-strategy.en.

[9] Ibidem.

[10] Ibidem.

[11] Ibidem.

[12] Ibidem.

[13] Ibidem.

[14] Ibidem.

[15] Ibidem.

[16] Ibidem.

[17] Ibidem.

[18] Ibidem.

[19] Ibidem.

Year LXII, 2020, Single Issue, Page 89

 

 

9^th MAY 1950.
JEAN MONNET:
THE REVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY

 

 

Every year, on Europe Day, the EU commemorates the declaration made by the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, on 9th May, 1950, which led to the birth of the ECSC, the first milestone in the process of European integration. May 9th, 2020 marked the 70th anniversary of this historic event.

Behind Schuman’s declaration, there lay remarkable commitment and endeavour, in the sphere of politics and political ideals, on the part of the individuals who drafted the memorandum Schuman took as his basis: Jean Monnet and his collaborators, particularly Étienne Hirsch, a member of the French Resistance who went on to become president of Euratom and subsequently of the UEF, and Pierre Uri, an economist who would later contribute to the drafting of the Treaty of Rome.

Although Schuman’s declaration was delivered in a different setting, with different references, there are a number of similarities between that momentous time and the state of affairs today; these similarities lie in the constant efforts, on the part of national governments, to resist unification, and also in the now urgent need to make a qualitative forward leap towards the creation of a form, even limited, of European sovereignty.

Europe has, of course, achieved many important advances since 1950: the European Community has been transformed into the EU; a single market has been created and consolidated; a single currency, the euro, has been introduced and is now adopted by 19 countries; we have a European Central Bank; and since 1979 the European Parliament has been elected by direct and universal suffrage. And yet Europe still lacks a crucial ingredient, namely the sovereignty that, in certain sectors, would allow it to speak with one voice and assume the status of a global power.

Monnet, in his Memoirs, recalls the major problem of addressing the matter of how peaceful Franco-German relations might be achieved in a period (1949-1950) in which public opinion, both as a result of the Cold War and because of the difficulties finding a solution to the “German question”, was fearful and alert to the winds of a possible new war. Monnet’s intuition, the product of lengthy reflection, both personal and with his group, was that the Franco-German problem could be transformed from a difficulty into an opportunity, providing it were viewed from a completely different angle. In short, it needed to be approached in European rather than national terms.

Monnet started from the concrete issue of coal production in the Ruhr and Sarre regions, and the need to solve the problems related to the management of this area, historically contested between France and Germany, in a way that would create a form of European sovereignty, albeit within a limited field.

His long experience (gathered during both world wars) of collaboration and alliances between states had left him convinced of the fragility of cooperation alone as a means of governing interdependence.

“It is astonishing how little the word ‘alliance’, which people find so reassuring, really means in practice if all it implies is the traditional machinery of co-operation (…). Total war at the level of the Alliance seemed to have no meaning, and certainly little hope of being achieved. In each of our countries the civil and military war machine was preparing, as best it could, to wage its own war. (…) Governments were acting separately.”[1]

Monnet had to face numerous issues and obstacles, but he was deeply convinced of the value of what he was undertaking, and was helped in his endeavour by the support of individuals and leaders of the calibre of Schuman and Adenauer, who grasped its importance.

In this regard, Adenauer, in his own memoirs, quoted by Monnet, recounts the following episode: “That morning I was still unaware that the day would bring about a decisive change in the development of Europe (…), news came that an envoy from French Foreign Minister Schuman had an important message for me. [The envoy brought] two letters from Schuman to myself (…). One of them was a personal, handwritten message [in which he] wrote that the aim of his proposal was not economic but highly political (…). I immediately informed Robert Schuman that I agreed to his proposal with all my heart.”[2]

In the feverish days leading up to the agreement on the final draft of the Treaty, Monnet had very clearly in mind the crucial idea of European sovereignty, although, in the face of misleading attempts to reach intergovernmental agreements, it proved difficult to promote. On 22nd June, in a meeting with the leaders of the delegations from the five countries involved, namely Hallstein (representing Germany), Suetens (Belgium), Spierenburg (The Netherlands), Wehrer (Luxembourg), and Taviani (Italy), he worked hard to resolve the issue of the management of the conference, and how to overcome institutional problems. However, the delegation leaders all followed the same line, and it showed “the natural bias of men accustomed to negotiating agreements between States or between producers — more or less secret agreements restricting free competition. They found it hard to adjust to the idea that this regulatory role could be entrusted to the High Authority, acting openly and with sovereign power.”[3]

Some wondered whether “important technical questions could not be settled by intergovernmental agreement before the High Authority was set up”, which, as Monnet remarks, “was the very opposite of the spirit and procedure of the Schuman plan.”[4]

Monnet’s view on the question of sovereignty emerges very clearly in his reply to a note from Macmillan: “The Schuman proposals are revolutionary or they are nothing. (…) The indispensable first principle of these proposals is abnegation of sovereignty in a limited but decisive field (…), in my view, any plan which does not involve this indispensable first principle can make no useful contribution to the solution of the grave problems that face us.”[5]

Monnet recognised the various obstacles in the way of introducing of a High Authority, at supra-state level, which is the premise for adopting a federal as opposed to an intergovernmental logic: “Turning to Spierenburg, I reminded him that intergovernmental co-operation had never led anywhere: ‘I realize’ I said, ‘that there may be serious concern about the radical change which the French proposal represents. But remember that we are here to build a European Community. The supranational Authority is not merely the best means for solving economic problems: it is also the first move towards a federation’.”[6]

The idea of converting a need into a political action was a very clear in Monnet, who recounts an environment that was willing to accept it, yet seemingly unable to promote it.

“Looking back on this mid-century period, one can hardly fail to be struck by the extraordinary ferment in men’s minds about the idea of European unity. The political parties and militant movements dealt with it in their manifestoes; statesmen discussed it in their speeches; articles were devoted to it in the press (…) one has the feeling that so rich a current of thought could hardly fail to bring about European unity on the broadest front. And, indeed, the vocabulary and arguments still used on the subject today were already current then. But they had nothing to do with action.”[7]

As the conference of the six founding countries got under way, there could be no doubting the importance of the work done by Monnet and his small group in those frenetic days: “by the time the (…) conference opened, I had on my desk a draft Treaty forty articles long containing in rough but recognizable form the basic structure for the organization of Europe. This text, which enlarged on the Schuman Declaration of May 9 and made it operational, was also the work of the same few people. Their contribution did not stop there: but, important as it was to be later, there is no doubt that this was an exceptionally creative phase. Such a phase in the history of ideas is always brief, and is often hard to distinguish from the later, practical phase which involves great changes for people and things.”[8] Significantly, Monnet adds: “In the course of what I said on June 21, I also went into a new aspect of the High Authority’s independence. It should (…) have its own revenue, drawn from a levy on coal and steel production, and not depend on government subsidies to finance its administration and its operational work. Its moral and financial credit would make it the best-placed borrower in Europe.”[9]

Notwithstanding the huge advances made in the field of European solidarity, and the help that the states are set to receive through the various European instruments that have been created to tackle the emergency, the historic challenge of the global pandemic, with the effects it is having on every aspect of life, is making one thing very clear: whenever a country, be it The Netherlands, Germany, or any other, rallies behind a national position and the defence of an alleged national interest, the old conflict between national interests and the European interest immediately returns to the fore.

Monnet was fully aware that such stances, while understandable and long established, only lead to confrontation. Today, like then, the question we have to ask ourselves is: can individual European countries, on their own, survive in the face of the immense problems of our times? If the answer is no, then it follows that a true European alternative must be created in the name of the “total solidarity” mentioned by Monnet, initially only in certain fundamental fields of course, but in such a way to ensure that the Union as a whole is kept from collapsing, thereby exposing the various countries to the risk of falling prey or victim to some other, extra-European, power just waiting for this to happen.

Just ahead of the Declaration on 9th May, Schuman in his preamble delivered before more than two hundred journalists in the Salon de l’horloge at the Quai d’Orsay, underlined the need for a profound change in international politics. “It is no longer a time for vain words, but for a bold, constructive act. France has acted, and the consequences of her action may be immense. We hope they will. She has acted essentially in the cause of peace. For peace to have a real chance, there first must be a Europe.”[10]

Subsequently, on 20th June, Monnet tells us, Schuman, opening the conference of the six participating countries, told them: “never before have States undertaken or even envisaged the joint delegation of part of their national sovereignty to an independent supranational body.”[11]

This was an entirely new approach, fortunately one supported by Germany, which Monnet had prepared in his exchanges with Adenauer, telling him, among other things: “We want to put Franco-German relations on an entirely new footing (…). We want to turn what divided France from Germany – that is, the industries of war – into a common asset, which will also be European. In this way, Europe will rediscover the leading role she used to play in the world and which she lost because she was divided. Europe’s unity will not put an end to her diversity – quite the reverse. That rich diversity will benefit civilization and influence the evolution of powers like America itself.

The aim of the French proposal, therefore, is essentially political.”[12]

Adenauer, addressing Monnet, was of like mind: “For me, like you, this project is of the highest importance: it is a matter of morality. We have a moral and not just a technical responsibility to our people, and that makes it incumbent upon us to fulfil this great hope. The German people have enthusiastically welcomed the plan, and we shall not let ourselves be caught up in details. I have waited twenty-five years for a move like this. In accepting it, my Government and my country have no secret hankerings after hegemony. History since 1933 has taught us the folly of such ideas. Germany knows that its fate is bound up with that of Western Europe as a whole (…).

‘Monsieur Monnet,’ he said, I regard the implementation of the French proposal as my most important task. If I succeed, I believe that my life will not have been wasted.”[13]

Accordingly, on June 13th, Adenauer addressed the Bundestag with the following words: “Let me make a point of declaring in so many words and in full agreement, not only with the French Government but also with M. Jean Monnet, that the importance of this project is above all political and not economic.”[14] 

* * * 

Today, unlike 70 years ago, the European Union has not just emerged from a ruinous war; nevertheless, it faces a series of grave problems that, if unresolved, threaten to wipe out the effects of years of integration. With the Covid-19 pandemic, the freezing of activities and trade in the single market, the repercussions of all this on employment and development, and the deepening of the states’ national debts, Europe seems to be plunging into an abyss. And as long as it has at its disposal only the existing systems and institutions, which set the states in opposition to one another and encourage selfish national stances, it will struggle to get out of it.

Rocked by the pandemic, the single countries, rather than trying to find a shared approach to their enormous problems, also in the healthcare sector, have made their own choices, often even in conflict with one another. The Union, like the emperor with no clothes, has been left exposed, and what we see is that there is really no union at all. There is certainly no European sovereignty, or “total solidarity” as Monnet might have said — no coming together to tackle the problems that matter through a body that represents the whole.

National governments, and the structures, bureaucracies and civil servants that underpin them, are reluctant to give up their power and jealously defend it against the intrusions of a necessary, but new, emerging power that frightens them. Only the French president, Emanuel Macron, perhaps mindful of the role played by France in 1950, has based much of his action, even before becoming president, on the idea of a political and sovereign Europe.

Among the EU institutions, the European Parliament, in particular, should claim to exercise this supranational European power, yet many MEPs are still trapped by what they know, and have yet to adopt a truly European mindset. They limit themselves to managing that which already exists, failing to see that this is no longer enough to ensure the survival of this institution. There is no more time to lose! It has become essential to abandon the national perspective and adopt a vision of things that shows us the common good, and indicates the unitary solutions to problems.

Jean Monnet, addressing Altiero Spinelli in 1952, said: “What we want is a revolution, and we must accomplish it with legal means, with statesmen who lack energy and any emotional commitment.”[15]

Anna Costa

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[1] Jean Monnet, Memoirs, Introduction by George W. Ball, Translated from the French by Richard Mayne, New York, Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1978, p. 18. https://archive.org/details/MonnetJeanMemoirs/mode/2up.

[2] Ibid., pp. 302-303.

[3] Ibid., p. 325.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., p.316.

[6] Ibid., p. 328.

[7] Ibid., pp.282-283.

[8] Ibid., pp. 321-322.

[9] Ibid., p. 324.

[10] Ibid., p. 304

[11] Ibid., p. 322.

[12] Ibid., pp. 309-310.

[13] Ibid., pp. 310-311.

[14] Ibid., pp. 319-320.

[15] Altiero Spinelli, Diario europeo 1948-1969, Bologna, edited by Edmondo Paolini, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1989, p. 140.

Year LX, 2018, Single Issue

 

 

CAN THE EUROPEAN UNION’S “DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT” BE FIXED THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS?

 

 

Democratic institutions, continually subject to challenge and change, are not static features of the political arena. European democracy has evolved substantially over the past fifty years in tandem with political developments. An expanding European Union is conferring substantial power on supranational institutions far removed from the people, if not fully independent of them.[1] This situation raises questions about the character of present and future democracy in Europe: who will do the governing and to whose interests should the governments cater when the people are in disagreement and have divergent preferences?[2] “Democratic deficits” can potentially derive from both the input and the output of the political process, in the first case meaning that citizens are not adequately represented in the legislative process, and in the second that policies do not adequately reflect voters” preferences.[3] Democracy needs to be based on consensus and participation, especially in Europe, given the size and variety of the political communities that form the EU. In the next paragraph, I analyse the “democratic deficit” concept in more depth, before setting it in the context of the European Union. Looking at the historical evolution of the European institutions and at their current structure, I argue that the “democratic deficit” in Europe lies in the lack of government for the people and government by the people. It is nevertheless necessary to define these two categories and identify their boundaries. To do so, I refer to Mosca’s[4] definition of political institutions, according to which representative democracy is a political system that offers the public some voice in the selection of the political elite, but cannot erase fundamental inequalities of power, with the result that societies differ primarily according to how their institutions provide for a “circulation of elites”; I then consider the current status of the European elites.

An analysis of democracy in the European Union needs to take into account two different relationships. First, there is the relationship between the citizens and the EU institutions, which is relevant to the issue of democratic representation (input): are the citizens of European countries well represented in the EU institutions? This question requires an analysis of the political arena generally, and whether it meets three basic conditions: 1) the existence of a public opinion, which makes the political process transparent; 2) the existence of a legislative process that does not involve too many levels of delegation, because delegation introduces noise; 3) the protection of minority rights.[5] With regard to this question of representation, it is crucial to understand that at European level it is not enough to have only national representation, meaning “all countries should be represented”; there must also be political representation, in the sense that members of supranational institutions should discuss issues from a political, rather than only a technical, perspective. The second relationship is that between the European Union and Europe’s national states: over the course of European integration, the national states have delegated competences to supranational bodies. However, since the complex system of the European Union means that supranational institutions create regulations, but the national states are still the ones implementing policies (output) in the areas most important for guaranteeing citizens de facto rights (i.e. the area of labour markets and that of social policies), it is crucial to understand whether the states can operate within the boundaries set by the European Union. Considering these two relationships together, and continuing to bear in mind Mosca’s definition, the question is: were the citizens of the European member states given the opportunity to vote on their representatives in the supranational institutions that set the rules by which their national governments must abide in acting on their preferences (and indeed on the very creation of these institutions)?

A brief historical excursus is needed in order to answer this question. Europe’s three main institutions, those that today hold legislative and executive power, namely the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union in the first case, and the Commission in the second, were originally created as European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) institutions under the Treaty of Paris of 1951, albeit with different names and functions. The prime ministers of six European countries signed this Treaty and subsequently the Treaties of Rome. Thereafter, the institutions evolved over time and welcomed new members, until eventually, in 1976, a decision of the European Council introduced elections to the European Parliament by universal suffrage; the first such elections took place in 1979. Today, the President of the Commission is elected by the European Parliament on the proposal of the European Council, while the Council of the EU is made up of the national states’ representatives (nationally elected representatives holding ministerial posts within their own governments). Going back to Crombez’s basic conditions for representation,[6] it is fair to say that the vox populi was not central in choosing the elites that created the European institutions[7] and that the system they built is complex and characterised by a high degree of delegation. A fundamental step in Europe’s integration was the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, which created the Economic and Monetary Union; thereafter, further steps were taken in this direction, too, leading to the creation of the European Central Bank, followed by the launch of the single currency. The ECB assumed control of the monetary policy of the countries that had signed up for the single currency, and the introduction of the euro led to convergence of interest rates across all the European states involved. Fiscal policy, on the other hand, remained in the hands of the national governments but was (in theory) subject to strict limitations.[8] Since then, sporadic and often inconsistent attempts have been made to align these national economies, which, however, continue to differ structurally, and in terms of the citizens’ priorities and preferences, with the result that policy output may diverge, as the eurozone crisis has indeed shown. In addition, to date, the sanctions that exist for violations of the strict fiscal policy rules have never been imposed.

With the citizens never having been able to choose, other than in a very indirect way, the elites representing them at supranational level, the lack of a European public opinion is a striking feature of the EU. That said, over time the institutions have evolved in a way that has given the EU an institutional framework that is not fundamentally undemocratic, by which I mean that a system consisting of a bicameral legislature and an executive can function democratically. The issues on which the democratic deficit debate has often focused in recent years, such as the precise composition of the institutions and the voting mechanism used within the Council, are interesting and important, but they do not fundamentally affect the institutional framework.[9] What is crucial, therefore, is the question of the “circulation of elites” within this framework. The behaviour of the elites, which translates into EU decision-making, is actually influenced more by what they consider to be national interests than by class conflict[10] or any other forms of social division that might be present within national societies. One reason for this is that the differentiation between delegation and subsidiarity within the EU is so complex that it becomes impossible to trace clear lines of accountability. As a result, the citizens are left struggling to understand Europe’s multi-level political dynamics, and the whole process of governance is left looking less than transparent. Furthermore, given the European Parliament’s limited powers, competition between political parties standing in European elections is not really meaningful as they shoulder no concrete responsibility for common policies, and elections therefore end up being fought on national issues. Accordingly, rather than pressing for circulation of elites at EU level, a first step would be to actually empower them. The fact that there exists no underlying sense of collective European identity, no European-wide political debate, and no European institutional infrastructure able to ensure the political accountability of those who hold political office at European level means that there is actually a triple deficit that seems impossible to overcome,[11] especially if we consider the failure to solve any of these problems prior to Europe’s eastward enlargement, since when they have only been exacerbated. In short, within Europe’s political organisation, there is no government by the people.

Moving on to the second aspect, that of policy output, or government for the people,[12] the importance of the subsidiarity principle emerges clearly if we ask the question: do the regulations passed by the highly delegated and technical European elites leave enough political and, more importantly, economic room for national or local policy-making? The democracy issue is less clear cut here than in the case of the need for government by the people, but nevertheless if the institutions were to pursue policies granting economic and social rights, then concerns over democratic representation should at least diminish. However, various problems immediately emerge: Europe’s capacity for positive integration is systematically limited by the plurality of national interests, which reflects the diverse identities present within the nation states. For this reason, European-level policy is strongest in the field of negative integration, where the Commission and the European Court of Justice have not encountered political obstacles in expanding the scope and intensity of market competition; for this reason, the policy options open to the governments of Europe’s capitalist economies have been considerably reduced, yet without this reduction being offset by a commensurate increase in the capacity for government at European level.[13] This rather broad statement is concretely illustrated by the Maastricht Treaty, which transferred monetary policy power to a non-elected body, the ECB, allowing it to set interest rates autonomously. The Treaty also laid down strict fiscal policy rules that leave the national governments little room for budgetary manoeuvre, especially in emergency situations, as the eurozone crisis has shown.[14] From the perspective of the balance of power between the EU member states, it should be remarked that the introduction of the euro has placed macroeconomic performances at the top of the European institutions’ agenda. Since the crisis, the difficulty of accommodating different economic structures and different types of welfare programme has been reflected in the formation of two opposing blocs, the northern European countries, headed by Germany, versus the southern ones. As the balance of power has favored the imposition of northern economic rigour, the southern nations have been left with even less scope for intervention. It is not my intent to support a “sovereignist” position here, but the analysis presented in this paragraph shows that the “move to the market”[15] is a consequence of the lack of scope for positive integration in the EU. In addition to that, in the wake of the crisis, diverging economic cycles have made it even more difficult to pursue government for the people.

According to Moore,[16] the development of democracy is a struggle to do three things: 1) identify arbitrary rules; 2) replace arbitrary rules with just and rational ones; 3) ensure that the population has a say in the making of the rules with which they have to comply. Numbers two and three are the steps that European democracy needs to realise in order to ensure government both for and by the people. However, solutions will not be found overnight. The current development of a European Banking Union may be considered an important step forwards in terms of avoiding the problem of diverging scenarios in times of crisis, while also increasing supranational surveillance of the banking system (and, indirectly, of national finances). In this regard, however, a paradox arises: the northern countries are opposed to the mutualisation of debt that would be required in order to complete the Banking Union, since they believe that their southern partners should first manage to reduce their debts; but at the same time, the latter, to the extent that austerity policies continue to be implemented, find themselves with very little scope for achieving this objective without cutting wages and social protection. This issue is harshly debated both in academia[17]^,[18] and in the institutions. This specific situation sheds light on a bigger picture: Europe’s supranational institutions were created by European states and have since been maintained by them, yet the states are unwilling to assign further power to them. This is illustrated by the fact that the Council is currently the most powerful institution, and probably the least transparent. Increasing the powers of the European Parliament, or giving the President of the Commission greater popular legitimation, through direct election to this office, would reduce the powers of the Council,[19] and hence of the states’ rulers. The complex system of checks and balances in place within the EU means that there is little incentive to move in this direction, as the quest for democracy would be transformed into a fight for power. However, the “small steps” approach to integration will find itself increasingly challenged by the globalised context in which the EU finds itself having to operate. The states’ capacity to temper market competition with social protection[20] will be depleted as an effect of the growth of international integration, and the question of government for the people could well be reduced to little more than an electoral slogan.

In conclusion, the causes of the democratic deficit in Europe lie in the EU’s institutional framework. European high officials in Brussels, calling for an “ever-closer union”, convinced that there is no alternative to European integration, have continually encountered resistance to their governance in the real world.[21] Europe’s existential crisis is entirely institutional, and the debate hinges largely on a crucial question that puts even greater pressure both on the national states and on the supranational institutions: who will do the governing for the people in the future? But the aspect they overlook is the importance of government by the people.

Emilio Massimo Caja

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[1] P.A. Hall, Institutions and the Evolution of European Democracy, in J.E.S. Hayward and A. Menon, (ed.s), Governing Europe, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 1.

[2] A. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries, New Haven – London, Yale University Press, 1999.

[3] C. Crombez, The Democratic Deficit in the European Union: Much Ado about Nothing?, European Union Politics, 4, n. 1 (2003), p. 103.

[4] G. Mosca, The Ruling Class, New York, McGraw Hill, 1939.

[5] C. Crombez, op. cit., p. 105.

[6] Ibidem, p. 104.

[7] L. Hooghe and G. Marks, A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus, British Journal of Political Science, 39, n. 1 (2008), pp. 5-6.

[8] P. De Grauwe, Design Failures in the Eurozone: Can They Be Fixed?, London School of Economics Europe in question discussion paper series, 2013.

[9] C. Crombez, op. cit., p. 115.

[10] S. Hix, The Political System of the European Union, London, Macmillan, 1999.

[11] F. W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 187.

[12] Ibid., p. 188.

[13] W. Streeck, From Market-Making to State-Building? Reflections on the Political Economy of European Social Policy, in S. Leibfried and P. Pierson, (ed.s), European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration, Washington, Brookings, 1995, pp. 389-431.

[14] Y. Dafermos, Debt Cycles, Instability and Fiscal Rules: a Godley-Minsky Model, Economics Working Paper Series No. 1509 (2015), University of the West of England.

[15] P.A. Hall, op. cit..

[16] B. Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Boston, Beacon Press, 1996.

[17] A. Benassy-Quéré, M. Brunnermeier, H. Enderlein, E. Farhi, M. Fratzscher, C. Fuest, P. Gourinchas, P. Martin, J. Pisani-Ferry, H. Rey, I. Schnabel, N. Véron, B. Weder di Mauro and J. Zettelmeyer, Reconciling Risk Sharing with Market Discipline: A Constructive Approach to Euro Area Reform, Policy Insight n. 91 (2018), London, CEPR.

[18] W. Schäuble, Non-paper for Paving the Way Towards a Stability Union (2017).

[19] C. Crombez, op. cit., p. 117.

[20] K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation, Boston, Beacon Press, 1957.

[21] J. Zielonka, Is the EU Doomed?, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2014.

 

Year LXI, 2019, Single Issue, Page 72

 

 

NEW TECHNOLOGIES, GLOBALISATION
AND EUROPE’S POST-2020 FUTURE

 

 

The “Global Trends” report[1] presented before the European Parliament on April 8th 2019 highlights the main mega-trends that will need to be addressed when formulating the EU’s political-strategic objectives for the coming years. Alongside issues relating to climate change, demographics and urbanisation, a particular focus will be the impact of new technologies both on the globalised economy and on international relations within a rapidly changing geopolitical scenario.

The “fourth industrial revolution” is now under way: its unfolding is radically changing the world as we knew it in the last century, and its consequences are set to affect upcoming economic, social and political trends, as well as the evolution of international relations.

These opening remarks prompt a series of questions: What is happening? What are the new scenarios? Who are the main competitors in the era of globalisation? What is Europe’s role?
 

The Changing Face of Production, the Economy and the Working World.

All these developments stem from the rapid transformation of the world of production, which is being shaped by the need to acquire and exploit new technologies, digitalisation processes and robots, in order to boost competitiveness, churn out huge quantities of high-quality products in record time, and eradicate human error.

There is no competitive manufacturing industry on the international markets that has not innovated and that does not exploit, as strengths, “Industry 4.0” technologies (i.e. new production technologies used, in a context of industrial automation, to improve working conditions, create new business models and increase the productivity of plants as well as the quality of what they produce) and collaborative robots (“cobots”). We now talk of “smart factories” where every aspect and area is interconnected: the design department, warehouse and production line, testing, customer management, product shipment, safety and security — all this in order to boost efficacy, cut waste and material stocks to the bare minimum, and increase flexibility and product customisation.

As shown by data referring to the past couple of years, research and innovation companies operating within the field of IT and technological/digital engineering have started to dominate the classification of the world’s top 10 most highly capitalised companies on the international markets.

In 2017, the “top ten” companies were: 1) ExxonMobil (hydrocarbons); 2) General Electric (conglomerate activities); 3) Microsoft (information technology); 4) Fitigroup (financial services); 5) AT&T (telecommunications); 6) Bank of America (banking/financial services), all USA concerns; 7) Toyota Motor (automotive sector), Japan; 8) Gazprom (hydrocarbons), Russia; 9) PetroChina (hydrocarbons), China; 10) Shell (hydrocarbons), The Netherlands.

In 2018, however, the ranking looked very different: 1) Apple (information technology); 2) Amazon.com (information technology); 3) Alphabel (information technology); 4) Microsoft (information technology); 5) Facebook (information technology), all USA; 6) Alibaba (information technology), China; 7) Berkshire Hathaway (banking/financial services), USA; 8) Tencent (information technology), China; 9) JPMorgan Chase (banking/financial services) USA; 10) ExxonMobil (hydrocarbons), USA.[2]

The dawn of this fourth industrial revolution is bringing developments that are revolutionising society, the labour market and the working world, sometimes with traumatic effects.

Nowadays, it is difficult for young people to say what job they expect to be doing in 20 years’ time. Faced with this question, there are, however, three things they should certainly take into account: first, that they will cover at least two or three different roles in that space of time; second, that many of the jobs they might occupy in the future do not even exist yet, while some of today’s jobs and professions are destined to die out; and third, that adaptability will be the key, given that everything in the global market and the technology market is changing all the time.
 

The International Struggle for Technology Dominance.

Cyberspace, the virtual environment of interconnected communications and information systems, is a new man-made, “non-natural” domain that transcends natural boundaries.

Also known as the “cybernetic domain”, it has joined the traditional domains of Earth, Sea, Sky and Space as a new sphere of human action, and its importance is increasing exponentially.

Digital technologies, as a result of today’s increasingly widespread and pervasive digitalisation processes, are now ubiquitous. Accordingly, they are assuming considerable strategic importance within an international system that, in recent years, has completely altered the global scenario that became established in the wake of WWII — a scenario that was, for many years, characterised economically and militarily by a sort of balance between the victorious powers, and by a marginalisation of Asian and Third World countries.

The fact is that the phenomena now emerging and developing within the context of commercial competition can be seen as a new front within the “old” quest for global hegemony. The aim of those engaging in this competition for and pursuit of technological hegemony is to identify and manage, to their own advantage, the myriad digital opportunities/vulnerabilities that characterise both daily life and the most technologically advanced environments.

The 21^st century struggle between the USA and China, in which Russia also insinuating itself (for now, through cyber meddling with the West), already concerns the domain of technologies based on artificial intelligence, and this will become its focus more and more in the future.

Over the past two/three years, Beijing, seeking to challenge America’s global dominance, has invested heavily in these sectors, which include 5G, big data and robotics. The “Huawei affair” (the arrest in Canada, on Washington’s orders, of the daughter of the Chinese tech giant’s founder) officially marked the start of the 21^st century’s “technological Cold War” (dubbed Cold War 2.0).

On a more general level, this conflict between Beijing and Washington will affect the links between the economy and national security and, like the USA-Russia Cold War of the last century, it will end up fueling a competition between the two superpowers’ respective spheres of influence. It is no coincidence that the countries, after Canada, that are most closely linked to the USA through intelligence agreements have all excluded Huawei from their domestic markets in the sensitive industrial 5G sectors (I refer to the UK, Australia and New Zealand, which, together with Canada and the USA, form the so-called Five Eyes alliance).

The issues at stake here are not only of a commercial nature, but also relate to “security” and future “geopolitical balances”.

This 21^st century struggle will also affect political systems and the internal balances of contemporary societies: according to Foreign Affairs, just as the Cold War of the 20^th century was based on the ideological differences between capitalism and communism, the Cold War 2.0 will be fought between liberal democracy (made more vulnerable by technological competition) and a new form of “digital authoritarianism”.
 

Technological Competition: the (Current) Protagonists.

The geo-economic and international political stage is currently dominated by two aggressive protagonists: the USA and China. Other players are Russia and the EU, the latter harbouring interesting but as yet untapped potential.

The USA, thanks to its high level of private investment and lively academic ecosystem, continues to maintain its clear leadership in the field of artificial intelligence.

China, currently engaged in a rapid and massive military modernisation effort, is aiming to catch up within the next decade or so, by making this area a new focus of public investment and research.

Russia, lacking the means of the other two powers and thus apparently sidelined, for the moment can only play its hand through cyber meddling with the West.

Europe, meanwhile, is lagging behind and struggling. In theory, the EU certainly has its own strengths to exploit, such its prominence in scientific research and vast digital market, but unless it invests significant resources in artificial intelligence technologies and creates a high-tech industrial capacity truly able to compete at global level, Europe is destined to remain crushed by the weight of the main competitors: the USA and China.

It is worth remembering that Europe is the most attractive market for tech products, be they produced in the USA or in China. Why? First, because Europe, with its 500 million plus “consumers” and over 23 million businesses, is the world’s largest economic area in which goods and people can move freely. Second, because it generates 35 per cent of total world exports of goods and services and 20 per cent of manufacturing added value, while accounting for 50 per cent of global welfare spending. Third, because 18 of the 20 countries most deeply integrated into global markets are EU member states.[3]

Therefore, the EU, if it values its sovereignty, needs quickly to recover a role as co-protagonist and become capable of autonomously controlling the key technologies that affect growth in the most advanced sectors; “controlling” these technologies means possessing and developing them, and maintaining them over time, which is to say providing and preserving them.

Germany and France are both well aware of this need, as shown by their joint signing, on January 22^nd 2019, of the “Aachen Treaty” in which they promised to “promote ethical guidelines for new technologies at the international level”.

Thanks in part to this Treaty, but also because of concerns over the escalating “competition” between the USA and China, as well as apprehension arising from China’s stepped up efforts (within its new “Silk Road” project) to enter into bilateral agreements with European countries, the European Commission, at the start of April, took the initiative of presenting, on the basis of the more than 500 contributions submitted to Brussels by the different sectors involved, a set of guidelines, or recommendations, on artificial intelligence.[4]

These list 7 key requirements of artificial intelligence, all of which revolve around humans (editor’s note: “humanism” is an intrinsic and specific value of European culture):

1. There must always be human supervision, given that the aim is to improve human action/intervention, not undermine human autonomy;
2. Algorithms must be secure, reliable and resistant to errors or inconsistencies in the various phases of artificial intelligence system life cycles;
3. Citizens must always be informed about the use of their personal data and given full control of the same so that they are not used against them, and this must be done in line with the EU data protection rules contained in the GDPR;
4. Transparency must be guaranteed, by ensuring the traceability of artificial intelligence systems;
5. Diversity and non-discrimination must be guaranteed, and human beings, taking into account all the necessary factors, must be enabled to modify the decisions of algorithms;
6. Artificial intelligence must work to promote societal and environmental wellbeing, boosting environmental sustainability;
7. There must exist forms of redress for those with grievances over algorithmic decisions, so as to ensure the accountability, in the event of damage or accidents, of those who manage the computer systems.

On June 7^th 2019, the European Council, with the aim of “boosting digital and economic competitiveness across the Union and digital cohesion” adopted its Conclusions on the Future of a highly digitised Europe beyond 2020.[5]

These “conclusions highlight the main priorities and challenges for a strong, competitive, innovative and highly digitised Europe. They refer to the importance of supporting innovation and encouraging European key digital technologies, respecting ethical principles and values in artificial intelligence, strengthening Europe’s cybersecurity capacity, improving e-skills, and developing the gigabit society, including 5G. They also underline the need to increase the number of women in the sector and to enable all vulnerable groups to reap the benefits of digitalisation so that no one is left behind.”

This Commission initiative, and the resulting intervention of the Council of the European Union, both much needed, risk being undermined by the undisciplined behaviour of Europe’s sovereign states, which attach more importance to their own grandstanding stances, even at the cost of possibly placing their own countries in a position of subjugation to China or the USA.

For this reason, the situation remains urgent: to be effective, the aforementioned guidelines on artificial intelligence demand broader and more unified political support among the European countries.

Crucially, therefore, there must emerge a convergence of political will to support a reform that will give the EU self-determination and powers to adequately address the challenges set out in the Global Trends report.

In more simple terms, this means drawing up, without delay, an “agenda” for the future of Europeans that is designed to allow a rapid transition towards a “Europe with federal institutions”. This must be a post-national and federal European-wide project that, combining a vision with a coherent and incisive approach to governance, is capable of creating a new Europe able to deal authoritatively with the countries that would have it subjected to their economic, political and military dominance.

Globalisation (be it technological, financial or economic) is irreversible and unstoppable. However, it is still possible to attempt to influence it, and that is something the eurozone countries can do: their role is to work together to launch a “different globalisation” that hinges on and rewards the social values associated with an inclusive economy and inclusive development, and that respects the dignity of the person, the dignity of human work and environmental sustainability.

This is certainly an ambitious objective, but it continues to be attainable, providing President Macron’s weighty and heartfelt warning is heeded: “The only way to ensure our future, is the rebuilding of a sovereign, united and democratic Europe”.

Piero Angelo Lazzari

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[1] European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), Global trends 2030: Can the EU meet the challenges ahead?, https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/sites/epsc/files/espas-report-2015.pdf.

[2] Mario Deaglio, Il mondo cambia pelle? Milan, Guerini e Associati, 2018.

[3] Konjunkturforschungsstelle (KOF), ETH Zürich, Index of Globalization 2017, https://www.kof.ethz.ch/globalisation/.

[4] Independent High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence set up by the European Commission, Ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/ethics-guidelines-trustworthy-ai.

[5] European Council, Boosting digital and economic competitiveness across the Union and digital cohesion, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/06/07/post-2020-digital-policy-council-adopts-conclusions/.